Archive for the ‘Nikkei 225’ Category

New Highs for the S&P 500
The S&P 500 continues to climb a wall of worry, despite temporary setbacks on concerns about the Fed’s announced tapering exercise, and then the Federal government shutdown and debt ceiling bruhaha. The Congressional mud-wrestling match about the budget and debt ceiling helped to cancel out immediate concerns about tapering, which the Fed put on hold in lieu of the Congressional budget and debt ceiling fight. Once Janet Yellen takes over as Fed chair early in 2014, we could very well hear more about tapering, but for now, investors are playing performance catch-up as we near the end of 2013, as the market cassandras wait in vain for “the” correction/selloff. 
Source: BigCharts.com

Consumer Discretionary, Health Care and Financials Continue to Lead

By S&P sector, consumer discretionary, health care, financials and the industrials have essentially been leading the market throughout 2013, and also led the latest upleg to new market highs. An improving housing market and balance sheet restructuring are supporting the financials and the consumer discretionaries, while the regulatory market is a tailwind for health care, and companies are widely expected to begin utilizing significant cash balances on the fifth anniversary of the global financial crisis.

Source: BigCharts.com

Fund Flows Returning to Euroland, But Japan Remains Best Performer

The U.S. stock market is not the only game in town, as the Japan market even in USD is still well in front of other developed markets in 2013 despite consolidating since May, and more recently, investor money is returning to Euroland, with France and Germany outperforming the US.
On the other hand, the biggest casualty has been the emerging markets, where an inevitable tapering by the Fed could begin sucking up the excess liquidity that had been driving these markets.

Source: BigCharts.com
Bonds and Commodities, As Well As Emerging Markets, Are the Losers
The biggest loser in terms of global fund flows and asset allocations is US treasuries, which of course had been the biggest beneficiaries of “haven” fund flows during the worst of the 2008 financial crisis, and the decades-long ultra loose monetary policy. It is now fairly obvious to all that the secular peak in bonds is past. The only issue is how far and how fast will long-term bond yields back up to levels that discount positive inflation plus a degree of sustainable economic growth. On the other hand, the USD index is largely flat over the past 52 weeks and basically a neutral factor for non-US investors. 
Source: BigCharts.com

However, the excess liquidity that was sloshing around in the commodities markets and gold to hedge against a possible collapse of the Euro and secular debasement of major currencies are no longer then. Implying that gold may also have already seen the peak of this major commodity cycle.

Source: BigCharts.com
The implications of the above are that investors should continue to go with the flow, which means to overweight developed market equities versus emerging markets, bonds and commodities. 
Japan Has Been Consolidating, But Continues to Maintain an Upward Bias
As Shinzo Abe and a revived LDP burst back into the forefront of Japanese politics, Japanese equities surged as, a) hedge funds piled into the short yen, long Nikkei 225 trade, and long-only managers scrambled to restore Japanese equity positions back to neutral weightings, i.e., about 8% in global portfolios and 20% in international portfolios. 
The Nikkei 225 however peaked in May along with a peak in speculative short JPY positions and the weakest retracement point in JPY/USD exchange rates. While speculators continue to bet heavily against JPY as indicated by the elevated level of shor JPY commitments of traders, JPY has yet to convincingly breach 100 JPY/USD for a second time as yet, and thus the currency has over the past several months been a drag on Japan’s stock market performance. 
The immediate upside bogey for the Nikkei 225 continues to be the 15, 627.26 high set in may, and while trading volumes have trailed off noticeably since this high, the market is trading toward a break-out of a clear apex that points to an upside, not a downside, move that could well take out the May high, clearing the way for a challenge of the 18,000+ highs hit during the Koizumi years. 
Source: OptiCast.co.jp

While Japan’s business sentiment is improving along with the GDP and component numbers, there is still a degree of caution regarding the immediate aftermath of the 3% point hike in the VAT next April, specifically regarding how much demand during the April-June 2014 quarter was front-loaded prior to the VAT hike. Ostensibly, the JPY5 trillion fiscal package timed to match the introduction of the VAT hike will ameleorate the demand backlash, and December worker bonuses are another dampening factor.

Considering the close link to JPY/USD during this rally, however, a convincing move to weaker than JPY/USD 100 is probably a pre-requisite for this move.

Source: BigCharts.com

Big Ticket Good News; The 2020 Olympics and a New Resort Casino Segment

In terms of big ticket good news, Japan’s winning of the 2020 Olympics had no appreciable favorable impact on stocks prices as a whole, despite noticeable speculative activity in perceived beneficiaries. For one, the speculation in real estate stocks was dampened by concern that the VAT hike will cool real estate demand.

However, there is another possible big ticket good news item, which is the impending approval for
casino operations in Japan. Since Tokyo won the right to host the 2020 Olympics, campaigns pushing for the creation of casinos in Tokyo and elsewhere in Japan have been gaining momentum. Investors are also very interested in whether the government will legalize casinos as part of its Abenomics economic policies. 

The IR (Integrated Resorts) caucus, a special-interest group made up of lawmakers from the Liberal Democratic Party, New Komeito, the Democratic Party of Japan, the Japan Restoration Party and others, envision the creation of integrated resorts comprising casinos, hotels and convention halls. The current impediments are a criminal law banning gambling and concerns that casinos would contribute to the deterioration of public order. Current Gov. Naoki Inose is a fervent supporter of the idea. But Tokyo assemblymen and local politicians say there is notable criticism from constituents who complain that the government should not be promoting gambling. Japan would also need to establish a strong, independent regulatory authority modeled on Nevada and Singapore’s gaming commissions, and that is what has been included in the government’s policy outline for legalizing, regulating and licensing gambling.

Legislators have submitted to current session of parliament, which runs through December, a bill that would allow authorized companies to operate “resort complexes” consisting of casinos, hotels and other facilities in government-designated areas.Casino development is also included in the ministerial council’s draft action program. One of the top candidate sites for the country’s first casino, is the Rinkai Fukutoshin (the Odaiba,Aomi and Ariake areas) waterfront in Tokyo, the area expected to provide the venues for the tennis and volleyball competitions during the 2020 Games.

Foreign interests like Macau’s casino king Stanley Ho have been lobbying multiple cabinet members in Japan for the legalization of casinos, promising investment of $5 billion if Melco Crown Entertainment gets permission to build. Wynn Resorts’ investment in a Japan casino would be over $4 billion, say sources, and MGM Resorts International,Las Vegas Sands Corp would be there with checks in hand as well, for locations in Tokyo and Osaka. The investment in integrated entertainment resorts alone could rival current estimates of the benefit of the 2020 Olympics. Analysts estimate a market consisting of two resort-scale casinos, one each in Tokyo and Osaka, could generate US$10 billion – US$15 billion (JPY1 to JPY1.5 trillion) in gaming revenue out of the gate, which likely would catapult the market to the second-largest in the world after Macau.

The trading by investor type data show that foreign investors remain the only consistent net buyers of Japanese equities, albeit at a more subdued pace. Over the past month, there has been some profit-taking in the banking sector (where the most foreign buying has been seen during the rally), trading companies and airlines.  Conversely, money has been flowing into Japan’s manufacturing sector and services, relative late-comers versus the sharp early gains seen in, for example, real estate. 
By Nikkei 225 constituent, the emerging winners are second-tier and late-coming manufacturers. The major electronics firms continue to noticeably lag, due to the structural nature of their problems that have not gone away just because of a modest weakening in JPY/USD. 
Nikkei 225 Winners & Losers

Keep an Eye On Foreign Investor Disillusionment With Abe’s Third (and fourth?) Arrows
Last year, piling into Japanese stocks when the Nikkei was below 9,000 was a no-brainer. Now, there is increasing evidence of more selectivity. For example, Coutts & Co., the wealth management unit of Royal Bank of Scotland, is cutting holdings of Japanese shares on concern Prime Minister Shinzo Abe won’t pass the structural reforms needed to boost the economy. They fear Abe will squander the early decisiveness of the Bank of Japan. With a sales tax increase looming in April and another in the pipeline, they fear Abe is failing to deliver on reform measures that would ease the burden of the levy.

So far, such shifts are but a trickle and in general a minority view. But as previously shown, given the still high outstanding short yen speculative positions, it wouldn’t take much to spool the JPY shorts, which as was seen in May could be the catalyst for a significant short-term selloff in Japanese equities. 

For now, however, we seen the Nikkei 225 as basing for a break-out to the upside rather than the downside. 

Stock Rally Runs Into A Storm of Uncertainty
The S&P 500 just ended its worst month since May 2012, but considering all the coming storm of uncertainty, it could’ve been worse. The DJIA, SP500 and Russell 2,000 have dropped below 50-day moving average support, as have the consumer discretionary, consumer staples, financials, healthcare, industrial, technology and utilities sectors within the S&P 500. The only indices/sectors still holding their 50-day MAs are NASDAQ, energy and basic materials.
Source: Yahoo.com
Source: Yahoo.com
Euroland stocks, where investors had begun to look for relative performance, are down 3.3% on the Eurostoxx 50 in recording its 2nd worst week in 11 months. EUR also had a bad week USD dropping back below 1.32. Interesting was the noticeable selloff in “less risky” core markets like Germany and France, while smaller markets like Belgium and Austria have managed to stay above their 50-day MAs. Spanish and Italian sovereign bond spreads jumped nearly 20bps, while Portuguese bonds were the hardest hit as Europe’s VIX spiked. 
Source: Yahoo.com
Source: 4-Traders.com
Emerging equity markets were already in a funk, as Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico and South Korean markets have already seen dead crosses between their 50 and 200-day MAs. Even once red-hot Japan (in USD-denominated EWJ MSCI Japan) has been unable to hold above its 50-day MA after attempting a rebound from a May hedge fund profit taking selloff. 
Source: Yahoo.com
What’s Bothering Stock Prices
What’s bothering stock prices? Basically, a significant increase in investor uncertainty, which they usually hate more than bad news, which can be better discounted than uncertainty. 
1. The first uncertainty was Fed chairman Ben Bernanke’s signaling of the Fed’s intention to taper back its “unlimited” QE program. The Fed appears heavily leaning toward implementing a tapering soon despite investor doubts about the sustainability of the US recovery, which could be further threatened by another fight over the US debt ceiling and military action in Syria. 
2. The second is another looming partisan fight over an extension of the US debt ceiling. There has been much confusion in the past several months relating to the US debt ceiling, and specifically the fact that total debt subject to the limit has been at just $25 million away from the full limit since late May. To avoid disruptions to the Treasury market, Congress will probably need to raise the deadline by mid-October. 
3. The third is “imminent” US military intervention in Syria. Secretary of State Kerry’s hard-hitting speech and reports that US action was “imminent” triggered rising crude oil and gold prices, while President Obama’s decision to back off and wait for US Congressional approval to act caught traders wrong-footed. The unrest, meanwhile, has proved a magnet for militant Islamists, including al-Qaeda affiliates and Iranian-backed Hezbollah. Refugee outflows, the threat of weapons proliferation, and widening sectarian rifts have stoked fears that the civil war may engulf the wider region. 
Reflecting this upsurge in uncertainty, the VIX has spiked, albeit well below what could be considered “panic” levels. Depending on how disruptive each of these on-the-immediate time horizon factors are, the current consolidation in global equity markets could linger, taking price levels back to intermediate-term support levels (e.g., 200-day moving averages) even if the long-term recovery trend is not broken, or even lower if the more bearish implications of each factor prevail. 
However, the looming Congressional fight over the budget ceiling and whether or not the US “punishes” Syria for using chemical weapons are inherently short-term market uncertainties, as is, to a lesser extent, the Fed’s tapering back of QE. Each factor of course has its cassandras warning of “dire consequences”. In the end, however, the outcomes, i.e., a shallow or more serious market correction, will depend on how sustainable the recovery in global balance sheets, economic activity and corporate profits is. 
Source: StockCharts.com
Crude Oil and Gold Corollary to Increased Market Volatility
The corollary to the uptick in S&P 500 volatility has been in the crude oil and gold markets. Crude prices (Brent) have rallied about 20% from April, while gold has rallied about 17% from late July lows, i.e., before the general perception that a US attack on Syria was perceived as “imminent”, on growing concerns about supply disruptions from Iraq, Libya and Nigeria from strikes and protests that have affected major oil terminals. Oil trading well above $100/bbl of course will act as a tax on the economies of nations most dependent on oil imports, including China and Japan.
Source: 4-Traders.com
Following a plunge in gold price that had some (including ourselves) declaring that the secular bull market in gold was “over”, gold has rallied some 20%, but is still well below the level seen before a selloff sent prices plunging 28% between January and April 2013. If direction of real interest rates is still basically upward, we still see little probability of new highs in gold, even though the recent market uncertainty has hedge funds and other speculators in late August at the highest levels in six months. 
Source: 4-Traders.com
More of the Same the Next Few Months 
Given that the Fed’s tapering, the debt ceiling fight and the Syrian question cannot be solved overnight, it looks like investors will be stuck with an increased level of uncertainty for the next few months, which implies continued consolidation in equity markets, somewhere between 50-day MAs and 200-day MAs. For the S&P 500, a pullback to its 200-day MA would bring the index back to the 1,550 level, or another 5%, following varying degrees of further consolidation in global equity markets. 
Assuming that the secular market trends established since March 2009 remain in place, the following table of 200-day MA levels and current prices indicates that the potential downside risk in an extended correction is greater for the NASDAQ, consumer discretionary, healthcare and Japanese equities, versus upside potential in US long bonds and gold…while crude oil could see a tumble, not a rally. Enhanced returns would be possible in the short-term by shorting the NASDAQ, consumer discretionary, healthcare and Japanese equities while going long long bonds and gold. Once the correction is over, however, these trades would need to be reversed. 
Source: Yahoo.com
Central Banks Increasingly Between a Rock and a Hard Spot on QE Wind-Down 
Investors remain under the impression that central bank quantitative easing is what has kept financial markets buoyant, papering over still-serious structural economic issues that are the legacy of the 2008 financial crisis. To a certain extent, this is true for financial markts. That quantitative easing is a “free lunch” way to increase wealth, however, is a magnificent illusion, at least as regards the two mandates of the U.S. Federal Reserve, a) employment and b) price stability. 
Even the IMF warns that a withdrawal from “endless” QE without a) a significant back-up in bond yields and b) a corresponding bond/equity market correction could be very tricky. As soon as central banks signal they are readying to halt QE (as the Fed has done), bond prices are “likely to fall sharply” as investors head for the door. The backup in rates could force central banks to push up rates even further to prove they have not lost control of inflation, i.e., more fuel on a market correction fire. The IMF warns, “The potential sharp rise in long-term interest rates could prove difficult to control and might undermine the recovery (including through effects on financial stability and investment). It could also induce large fluctuations in capital flows and exchange rates.” 
Further, even research by the San Francisco Fed indicates that “Asset purchase programs like QE2 appear to have, at best, moderate effects on economic growth and inflation; the key reason being that bond market segmentation is small. Moreover, the magnitude of LSAP effects depends greatly on expectations for interest rate policy, but those effects are weaker and more uncertain than conventional interest rate policy. This suggests that communication about the beginning of federal funds rate increases will have stronger effects than guidance about the end of asset purchases.” 
Total Credit Market Debt Makes the (Economic) World Go Round, Not QE 
Thus withdrawal from QE will be tricky for financial markets, while even more QE means minimal impact on the real economy at best and a growing risk of other moral hazard bubbles that will have to be dealt with. How disruptive this attempted withdrawal will be hinges on the movement in total credit market debt, which is the real driver of modern economies, and consists of both private and public sector credit growth. Immediately after the 2008 financial crisis, credit availability from the financial sector’s shadow banking system shrank, taking the economy with it. This shrinkage (plus other private sector balance sheet adjustments) was eventually covered by the public sector, allowing for growth, albeit at weaker-than-normal-recovery levels. 
IF the pick-up in private sector credit creation is strong enough, the economy should continue to grow even as the Fed–whose QE-driven credit creation impact was doubtful at best–begins to scale back. 
Hat Tip: Zero Hedge
“Money is hugely important, but also ultimately trivial. The productive forces of a society are what matter in the end.” (Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, The Telegraph).
The theory behind QE (quantitative easing), is that in essence, central banks buying long-term government bonds from private investors’ portfolios encourages investors to rebalance their portfolios toward riskier assets as a risky asset has been removed and replaced with safe central-bank reserves. Ostensibly, the price of all risky assets, including remaining privately-held long-term Treasury bonds, rises, and bond yields fall.
Central bankers were successful in preventing the collapse of the financial system after the 2008 crisis. The aim of the programs were initially to alleviate financial market distress, but this goal was soon broadened to include, a) achieving inflation targets, b) stimulating the real economy, c) boosting employment and d) containing the European sovereign debt crisis. The role of QE in containing the European sovereign debt crisis is demonstrable, while the positive effect of all this QE on the broader economy is questionable. 
The proliferating research on the effects of QE generally indicates that, while having the desired effects on asset prices, the effects on the broader economy are much more difficult to discern. The latest research by none other than the San Francisco Fed concludes that, “asset purchase programs like QE appear to have, at best, moderate effects on economic growth and inflation.” 
Regardless of the reality, it is important to propagate the “QE generates economic growth” meme to maintain the impression that the Fed at least is on the case, doing whatever is necessary to maintain stability in the financial system and promote growth, in the interest of maintaining consumer, business and investor confidence.
Investors are Right to be Concerned about “Imminent” Fed Tapering, as the QE Effect on Asset Prices has Been Demonstrated
Since anecdotal and academic research has clearly shown that QE has had significantly beneficial impact on asset prices, investors are right to be concerned about “imminent” Fed tapering, while its impact on the real economy (and economic growth expectations) is thin at best. In other words, the Fed’s (and other central bankers’) quandry is that, while more QE is unlikely to be instrumental in re-accelerating and sustaining economic growth, current QE is a significant factor in present levels of risk asset prices.
Potential Unforeseen Toxic Side Effects of Massive QE 
QE critics continue to warn of the potential negative side effects of QE, including a) serious currency debasement, b) the prelude to virulent inflation, c) destabilization of the global financial system, d) worsening an already bad government debt situation by making the cost of government borrowing more expensive, e) seriously distorting financial markets as excessive risk-taking (more bubbles) is in effect encouraged.
1) Regarding serious currency debasement, since all of the major developed nations whose currencies dominate global currency trading are deeply embedded in QE programs, the relative currency debasement in terms of depreciation of each currency against its peers has been limited. In terms of the US trade-weighted index, the bulk of the depreciation since 1985 actually came before QE, i.e., between 1985 and 1995. For various reasons, this secular decline in the effective value of USD has not seriously hindered the US ability to issue debt overseas to offset a chronic balance of trade and fiscal deficit.
Source: US Federal Reserve
2) In terms of destabilizing the global financial system. One can credibly argue that the global financial system has been stabilized by QE to date, not destabilized. The Cleveland Fed financial stress index (US only) shows that general financial stress to low levels seen in 2006/2007. 
Source: US Federal Reserve
3) Thirdly, there is as yet no solid evidence that a) inflation expectations have shifted significantly upward and b) that inflation is on the verge of becoming virulent. Since inflation generally remains “well anchored”, virulent inflation does not appear imminent. 
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve
That leaves us with the serious distortion and instability of financial markets, and the claim that QE creates serious moral hazard that eventually creates yet more bubbles and market crashes. 
We have already seen the Dot.com bubble that burst in 2000, the housing bubble that burst in 2007, and the commodities bubble that burst in 2011. The two biggest bubbles by far today are; a) the bond market bubble and b) the bubble in government debt, both of which have been running largely unchecked for decades. Actually, historically low bond yields have facilitated the government debt bubble, as governments have largely been able to issue debt at will with no negative implications as regards rising bond yields. 
(1) The yield on the US 10-year treasury has been declining continually since a 1981 peak at a now unthinkable 16%. In other words, the bond bubble is now in its 32nd year! This massive secular decline in bond yields has facilitated an equally massive increase in outstanding government debt. 
Source: About.com
The worst financial crisis/great recession since the 1930s only accelerated the structural surge in government debt over the past decades. By 2013, the combination of continued weak economic growth and surging government expenditures to offset the negative impact of this weak growth had pushed debt to GDP for the entire OECD region to over 100%. Thus, while Japan is in a class by itself, soaring debt to GDP ratios are a common feature of all developed nations. 
As is often stated, that all bubbles must eventually burst, both the multi-decade bond bubble and the government debt bubble will also eventually burst. If the bond bubble bursts first and bond yields stage a significant surge, the bursting of this bubble could trigger the bursting of the government debt bubble. 
Historically, government debt bubbles in large countries (that have control of their own currency) have not suddenly collapsed, but tend to be unwound very slowly over years or decades. A collapse in government finances, a collapsing currency and soaring yields on sovereign debt no one wants to buy have so far been contained to specific, smaller country examples, even though it is not historically unusual for a country to default on its debts, particularly external debts. Studies of historical examples of excessive debt do indicate however (despite the dissing of the Rogoff, Rheinhart research) that high debt levels are a brake on GDP growth and productive economic activity. 
Source: OECD
Japan however remains on the short list of indebted OECD nations at risk of a “black swan” event that blows up its bond market, given the unprecedentedly (in peace time) high level of its government debt. We believe Japan’s debt question will continue to be a major hinderance to a complete recovery in its stock market, at least until the government can demonstrate it is getting its arms around the problem.
However, given the sheer size of the problem, it is highly unlikely that Japan will ever be able to pay off this debt with a combination of conventional economic growth combined with fiscal austerity and monetary accomodation. The easiest way out is inflation, while the BoJ has already embarked on an unprecedented level of debt monetization. 
Japan: Not a Word About Monetization
Yet Governor Haruhiko Kuroda cannot admit that the BoJ is now the debt-financing arm of the Japanese finance ministry (as it was under Takahashi), or that the bank is systematically mopping up as much debt as it can get away with, while the going is good, never to be repaid. He dare not utter the word monetization for fear that the debt vigilantes would pounce on artificially depressed bond yields. 

As pointed out by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard of The Telegraph,“financial repression” has overwhelmed the Japanese bond market…but at what cost? BoJ debt monetization is effectively an internal redistribution of wealth within Japanese society, from creditors to debtors, who in this case is the government. It is an inter-generational wealth transfer, where those retiring five, ten, or fifteen years will be poorer: while the burden on those who are now young children will be less onerous.
Since even the Fed has now admitted that QE has little, if any, real impact on the economy, expecting the BoJ’s aggressive QE alone to revitalize Japan’s economy is a fool’s game. Further, the weaker-than-expected Q2 Japan GDP is a yellow card regarding the government’s “full speed ahead” hike in VAT (from 5% to 8%, or 3 percentage points) next April, which will cause a negative hit to GDP growth. In the best case, this hit will be temporary and offset by a fiscal band-aid. 
In the worse case, as was true the first time VAT was introduced, it causes Japan’s economy to sink back into the funk, preventing it from achieving the escape velocity that has eluded Japan’s policy makers for the last 20 years. While the structural health of Japan’s economy is much healthier than in April 1997, in the middle of Japan’s banking crisis. 
Cracks in the “Japan is Back” Meme
The biggest response in terms of the Nikkei 225 and weakening JPY was when Abenomics was still basically a concept. Then, foreign investors could read into what they wanted about newly elected prime minister Shinzo Abe’s platform. 
Once in office, having installed an aggressive BoJ governor (Kuroda) to unveil an extremely ambitious QE program, the LDP winning big not only in the December 2012 lower house but also in the July 2013 upper house elections, Abenomics is being picked apart by investors to see what’s actually real and what is mere smoke.

To be really convincing, the Nikkei 225 has to break out above its June 2007 high of around 18,300, or some 32% higher than where it is today. Breaking through this high would indicate that Abenomics is not only as important as the Koizumi Reforms, but will exceed them, ostensibly putting Japan back on a sustainable growth curve. Unfortunately, the last several attempts to break the secular downtrend in place since 1990 have of course failed. 

Source: Yahoo.com
The first hurdle is to break the extremely close link that has developed between JPY and the Nikkei 225 because of the “short JPY, long Nikkei 225” trade. As the following chart shows, the Nikkei 225 is ultra-sensitive to JPY/USD fluctuations, meaning JPY inability to weaken beyond 100 JPY/USD has become a significant impediment to the Nikkei 225, which continues to consolidate well below the May rebound high.

Source: Yahoo.com

It is also interesting to note that most of the weak yen move came before new BoJ governor Kuroda was instated and launced his “all in” QE program.

We believe investors (particularly domestic) are now keying on the next major event, which is whether or not the Abe Administration will follow through and implement the higher VAT from April 2013. Ostensibly, JPY and bond investors would react negatively if Abe decides to postpone action on the VAT, given their international commitment to do so. At the same time, an equally larger than expected hit from the higher VAT on the economy would have an equally or greater negative impact, justifying fears that a “premature” VAT hike again killed a Japanese recovery.

Given this environment, any volatility caused by nervousness about the Fed’s tapering off of its QE program would only exacerbate these negative reactions.

Consequently, while we are not ready to throw in the towel on Abenomics, we are basically neutral on Japanese equities until it is apparent that the Nikkei 225 has discounted the VAT hike and any negative GDP fallout, as well as the increased volatility from a Fed taper.

Abenomics is apparently unfolding as predicted by Shinzo Abe himself. The LDP sweeps back into power in the December 16, 2012 Lower House elections, the newly installed Abe Cabinet outlines a “three arrow” scenario, chooses a new BoJ governor that is not afraid to try aggressive policies, and who immediately uncorks the boldest BoJ actions perhaps in the Bank’s history, the LDP cements its majority with another landslide win in the Upper House elections in July 17, 2013, and the Abe Administration is now tackling an inevitable hard-wired VAT hike, amidst evidence that Abenomics is beginning to change inflationary expectations as well as economic growth expectations. 
As surprised foreign investors/traders digested the implications of Abenomics and an extremely aggressive BoJ, the narrative was that these actions would dramatically weaken JPY, especially as it appeared Japan’s balance of payments had now turned to structural deficit after some 40 years of chronic surpluses.
Source: 4-Traders.com
But the selloff in JPY vs USD appears to have lost essentially all of its momentum after quickly retracing some 56% of the appreciation from a 2007 low of around JPY124/USD to the JPY76/USD level immediately after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake/tsunami/nuclear disaster. JPY/USD is now languishing below the psychologically important JPY100/USD, and has reversed only 56% of the 2008 financial crisis appreciation. Even the LDP landslide election win in the July 2013 Upper House elections barely moved the needle. 
Bulk of Investment Fund Flows Remain Inward, Not Outward 
At first, there were expectations of a rush of funds from domestic institutions into foreign bond markets. That is not happening to a significant extent. The corollary expectation was that domestic institutions would shift portfolios from JGBs to equities. That has not happened to a significant extent either.
Source: Ministry of Finance

Meanwhile, foreign investors continue to pile into Japanese equities at a record pace, a pace that surpasses even the huge inflows seen between 2003~2007 with the Koizumi reforms, although the peak in these purchases has already passed, and European investors have already begun to take some profits.

Source: Ministry of Finance

Even a More Aggressive BoJ Policy Cannot Compete with the Fed’s Debt Monetization 
Even though the BoJ’s QE in terms relative to Japan’s economy is some 3X as large as the Fed’s “unlimited” QE, the liquidity overflow into foreign markets is much more limited, partially because JPY is not as widely accepted in global trade and financial instrument settlements, or even central bank foreign currency assets. Thus while the BoJ’s asset purchases are unprecedented for Japan, they pale in comparison to the sheer size of the Fed’s USD85 billion per month asset purchases that has the Fed already owning over 30% of the US treasury market.

Under more “normal” circumstances, the main driver of USD/JPY exchange rates is the yield differential between US and Japanese bond yields, such as the 2-year and the 10-year yield spread. Historically, USD/JPY has been more sensitive to the 2-year US-Japan bond yield spread, but since the Fed and the BoJ have their boots firmly on the shorter end of the curve, USD/JPY has recently disconnected from the spread differential on the shorter end of the curve. And while the 10yr spread has widened, it is still not enough to really push yield-hungry domestic institutions into foreign bonds, considering the forex risk. The last time USD/JPY was at JPY120 or weaker, the spreads were more like 250~350 bps.

Source: Amsus, Nikkei
Source: Amsus, Nikkei
Thus, as long as the Fed still has to carefully negotiate tapering to avoid upsetting the market recovery applecart, US bond yields remain anchored at levels that are insufficient to really drive a weaker JPY, regardless of how aggressively the BoJ pushes on their string. 
Ongoing Uncertainty About the Third (and Fourth) Arrows of Abenomics 
Initially, foreign media at least saw it as crucial that Abe pushes ahead with plans to raise a controversial consumption tax, from 5% to 8% in 2014…the major assumption being that Japan’s economy would be in a sustaintable recovery path by then. Ostensibly, the July election means “all systems go” for Abenomics, as the ruling coalition (LDP and Komeito) now has a majority in both houses of parliament. But while the Finance Ministry and its head spokesman, Taro Aso, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, would like to commit to the tax increase as soon as possible, Abe and his advisors are more cautious, wanting to make sure the recovery has roots before implementing a tax hike that could deep six any consumption recovery. 
Secondly, investors and businesses, while liking what they see so far about Abenomics, are still unsure whether Abe will seize the opportunity to transform the world’s third largest economy, or defaults (because of various barriers within and without his own party), to the same path as predecessors, and reform efforts fizzle. The history of Japan’s reform efforts is riddled with false starts and failures, whereas the Abe Administration brings a consistency of fiscal and monetary policy in Japanese politics not seen in the modern era. Even the reformer Junichiro Koizumi (2003~2005) did not have as supportive a central bank as Abe apparently has, whereas the Koizumi Administration did enjoy a booming global economy for Japan to lever off of. 
As far as domestic investors and businesses are concerned, Japan’s economy is only beginning to show green shoots of recovery, and while there is hope that Abenomics will revive the economy, most domestic institutions and companies would like to see solid evidence that the recovery has taken root before the government rushes to raise taxes. This is because, at least in recent history, Japan’s economy has only managed to put in a couple or maximum four quarters before again sputtering. 
Consequently, there is still insufficient evidence of a) a sustainably strong US recovery, b) positive bond yield rises, i.e., because of rising demand and not fear of tapering, and c) an expanding US-Japan bond yield spread to drive a significantly weaker JPY/USD rate. 
There’s Even a Not Zero Probability of Renewed Selloff
If the Fed bumbles its tapering strategy, we could see a sharp short-term run-up in US bond yields and significantly higher volatility in the US equity and bond markets, which of course would negatively impact global markets, including Japan. Despite the sharp selloff from a rebound high in May, the Nikkei remains the best-performing equity market YTD and thus represents a potential source of liquidity should high volatility and profit-taking hit global markets, ostensibly triggered by a US selloff. Even without a bungled US montary tapering, the Nikkei could be blind-sided by a renewed run-up in JPY given that Japanese stock prices remain extremely sensitive to currency movement.
As is shown in the chart below, the bears that shorted the Nikkei in May made a quick buck, while the Nikkei is still susceptible to profit taking, as it is bumping up against what is a 20-year resistance line, as pointed out by Chris Kimble of Kimble Charting Solutions. Thus if you still are a buyer of Abenomics, you nevertheless need to be prepared for some market volatility and even some selling. 
Source: Yahoo.com
U.S.: Making Mountains Out of Molehills?
The past couple of weeks have seen a shift to risk off and an unwinding of carry trades triggered by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s infamous “taper” comments. The following chart comparing the S&P 500 and Bloomberg’s U.S. economic surprise index (hat tip: Zero Hedge) shows the growing disconnect from March of this year onward between economic expectations and stock prices—i.e., U.S. stock prices were reaching new highs while the macro index was hitting new lows. Thus a “mark to economic reality” for US stock prices was overdue before Chairman Ben’s comments. The only investors that should have been “shocked” by the move in US stocks recently are those who had heretofore been waiting for a meaningful correction but already caved in and bought the market…just before Chairman Ben set traders scurrying to unwind positions. 
However, the equity market’s sanguine reaction to worse-than-expected Q1 GDP data does indicate a) underlying confidence in the US economy’s ability to continue recovering and b) that the factors supporting stock prices are not all central bank cool aid. Despite the inevitable backing and filling, the trend in the S&P 500 is still up. With the point & figure chart of the 30-year bond indicating some 8% more downside for 30yr treasuries, the point & figure chart for the S&P 500 is indicating something more like total downside risk of some 11% to 1,500, i.e., not a new secular bear market. Assuming the S&P 500 corrects to its current post-crisis recovery trend line, it is obvious there is still some more short-term downside risk in stock prices….but not, as yet, evidence of a serious cracking of US stock prices.
Hat Tip: Zero Hedge
Bonds Were Beginning to Selloff Before Chairman Ben’s Infamous “Tapering” Comments
30yr US treasury prices already peaked mid-year at the height of risk aversion in 2012. Since then, the 30yr TB has sold off nearly 13%. Since the early 2012 low of 135.38 is not apparently holding, the Point & Figure charts are indicating another 12% or so of downside risk. Weighing on bond prices is a) better confidence in the sustainability of the US economy (housing, employment, etc. improvement), and b) the possibility that the Fed begins backing off earlier than latter, and c) waning concerns about the strength of the global economy. 
From a long-term perspective, the writing is on the wall for bonds, US treasury prices are clearly breaking down. The issue then becomes if the unwinding of the great bond rally becomes a gradual selloff or a full-scale rout. Since long bond prices were already consolidating before any hint of Fed tapering, we would guess that the the “good” upward pressure on bond yields, i.e., improving economic expectations, as well as reduced global tail risk are not insignificant factors in current bond yields.
On the other hand, since the repair process in the Eurozone and Japan significantly lags that of the U.S. and growth in the emerging markets is less than stellar, inflationary expectations remain, in Fed-speak, “well-anchored”. 
Hat Tip: StockCharts.com
Historically, rising rates have not always meant falling stock prices. In the great run-up of bond yields culminating in the oil crisis peak, the worst damage to stock prices (then, a secular bear market) was as bond yields rose from 4% to 8%. Thereafter, however, stock prices entered a 28-year bull market even as yields were spiking to 16%–implying that the mix of economic factors is just as important or perhaps even more important than interest rates alone. 

Hat Tip: The Big Picture
Watch the Global Canaries in the Coal Mine 
From a tail risk perspective, investors are less afraid of the impact on US equities from an easing of the Fed’s heavy $85 billion/month boot on the US bond market than they are of, a) the potential downside in bond prices, b) renewed crisis in the Eurozone and c) a sputtering Chinese economy. Thus compared to other financial markets, the correction in US stocks so far is a tempest in a teapot because US stocks remain the best game in town, or alternatively, the least dirty shirt in the closet to those of a more bearish persuasion.  
Globally, the real canaries in the equity coal mine are the Eurostoxx Banks index (as an indicator of renewed Eurozone sovereign debt crisis risk) and the Shanghai Composite (as an indicator of the state of the Chinese economy). The Eurostoxx Bank index is in the process of confirming 2012 lows, while the Shanghai Composite has collapsed to a new low. 
Both of these indices remain in long-term bear markets after a brief but sharp bounce in 2009. The Eurostoxx Bank index, which has surged some 75% as sovereign bond yields in the troubled southern Eurozone nations plunged on assurances by Mario Draghi and the ECB that they would do whatever it takes to “save” the Euro, has quickly given back over 20% of the recent high above 127. However, the index remains well above the 2012 low, although it is in the process of testing downside resistance. On the other hand, the rebound in the Shanghai Composite from the 2012 low has been much more anemic as the Chinese central bank struggles to contain a property/housing bubble, and the interbank liquidity squeeze has sent the Shanghai Composite plummeting below its 2012 low. The renewed selloffs in both indices bears close watching, because a dramatic slowdown in the China economy and renewed crisis in the Eurozone are something that “got your back” Chairman Ben cannot help you with.
Hat Tip: 4-Traders.com
The Implications for Other Emerging Markets and Commodities are Not Good 
The implications of renewed lows in both of these indices are already being discounted in the commodity and emerging markets, both of which are more sensitive to risk asset flows. This can be seen in the breakdown of support in both Copper and the EEM MSCI Emerging Market ETF. While the recovery in the US housing market should be good news for copper, everyone knows that demand from China has been the incremental driver of demand for copper and other major commodities. Emerging markets in Asia are of course closely tied with slowing import demand from China, whose real GDP growth is looking much less than the headline 7% or so quoted by most public and private sector economists. 
It is too early to tell if trying to catch these falling knives will yield short-term results, while the road back to prior highs is becoming more difficult with each day. Hear again, US equities remain the default choice.
Hat Tip: 4-Traders.com, BigCharts.com
Investors Can No Longer Hide Out in Gold 
Gold (especially paper gold) as an alternative currency and safe haven is rapidly losing its luster, as the relative attractiveness of the yellow metal dramatically shifts as real interest rates turn positive and the serious “infernos” around the world (e.g., Eurozone crisis, etc.) begin looking more like brush fires. 
Gold bugs and precious metals analysts will give you all sorts of technical reasons why gold prices are about to bottom, but (paper) gold prices have plunged through 1,550 and 1,350 support like hot butter, and while dramatically oversold short-term (and thus susceptible to short-term bounces), the dramatic rally since 2009 is clearly over, with previous calls for $2,000 or $3,000/ounce now looking like a pipe dream. 
We see driver of lower paper gold prices as being fairly straightforward, i.e., positive real interest rates, and believe those who are in paper gold as an “investment” are in for more pain. On the other hand, the strong underlying demand for physical gold as an emergency fund is stronger than ever. 

Hat Tip: 4-Traders.com
The Eventual Success of Abenomics Hinges on Structural Reforms 
The LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) winning back power and the bursting of Abenomics on the scene generated a quick nearly 90% gain in the Nikkei 225 from mid-October 2012, as JPY/USD dropped nearly 25% in equally quick fashion. A sharp back-up in JGB yields on high volatility from a new low of around 30bps to over 1% however shook some short JPY, long Nikkei 225 macro traders out and even encouraged some opportunistic futures short selling, and the stock index remains extremely sensitive to JPY/USD, which also saw a sharp short-term snap-back—against the background of continued heavy net selling of Japanese equities by domestic institutions. 
The accelerated downtrend in the Nikkei 225 as Japan was hit by the Great East Japan earthquake/tsunami/nuclear power plant disaster only exacerbated the damage done to Japan’s economy and financial markets by the 2008 financial crisis, delaying recovery well beyond what was happening in the U.S. An ineffectual Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led government only made matters worse. Thus in the very least, the Abe Administration has managed in a few months to repair the damage to stock prices from the Great East Japan disaster by drawing record amounts of foreign buying and giving long-suffering domestic businesses and individuals reason for hope. 
Hat Tip: 4-Traders.com
Domestic Institutions Remain Structural Net Sellers of Japanese Equity 
The sharp reversals in both the Nikkei 225 and JPY/USD indicates that the big money has already been made in the Abenomics trade. The biggest quarterly rally in Japanese stocks in 25 years did not impress domestic institutions, who if anything have been accelerating their unloading of Japanese equities. As of end March 2013, Japan’s insurers, lenders and trust banks pared their holdings of Japanese shares to 28% of total market value, as the share held by foreign investors surged to 28%. Domestic institutions have been net sellers of Japanese equities every week since mid-November 2012 through June 14, 2013. 
Basically, domestic investors aren’t buying Abenomics. Too many past governments have come and gone with grandiose promises that never made much of a dent in Japan’s structural problems. Thus domestic institutions remain very much in a “show me” mode, and structurally constrained from a more constructive “risk-on” mode. Basically, these institutions have little incentive to pursue higher returns (risk) while they have many reasons to avoid risk. Thus their share of total market trading fell to a mere 4.7% last month. On the other hand, individual investors are now accounting for more than 40% of trading volume, making the Japanese stock market one of the most volatile in the developed world. In terms of stock price formation, it is anywhere and everywhere foreign investor driven. 
What this means is that Japanese stock prices are likely to remain volatile, as foreign hedge funds and domestic traders whip around market prices at significant inflection points. Abenomics still has forward momentum, but the “shock and awe” factor has melted away to reveal deep underlying skepticism. 
While Japan’s giant GPIF (government pension investment fund) did hint at higher future allocations to risk assets including equities, new asset allocations announced on June 7 are in line with those as of end December 2012. Basically, it is very unlikely that these institutions will in the foreseeable future ever play a meaningful role as a net buyer of stock. Market volatility has given domestic instituions another excuse to stay away from equities. 
With foreign investors more risk adverse and trimming back on more volatile trades, it is unlikely that a new high in the Nikkei 225 or new lows in JPY/USD will be hit anytime soon. More likely is a fairly well-defined trading range as these markets consolidate the sharp moves of the past six months.
Making the Most of Borrowed Time? 
Despite the recent jitters about Chairman Ben’s tapering comments, the fact remains that the US Federal reserve is still the most trusted central bank among investors in the world, regardless of disparaging comments to the contrary. While the Fed’s tapering comments may have appeared to some to come out of the blue, recent comments by the Bank of International Settlements are probably a good reflection of the debate that is going on within the walls of the world’s central banks. 
Central banks can be commended for having bought the private and public sectors the time need for adjustment from the 2008 financial crisis and worst recession since the 1930s depression years. Since the beginning of the financial crisis almost six years ago, central banks and fiscal authorities have supported the global economy with unprecedented measures. Policy rates have been kept near zero in the largest advanced economies, and central bank balance sheets have ballooned from $10 trillion to more than $20 trillion, and the stimulus has surged 500% since 2000 to $16 trillion. Meanwhile, fiscal authorities almost everywhere have been piling up debt at an alarming rate, which has risen by $23 trillion since 2007. Half a decade ago, most, if not all, of these measures were unthinkable. 
Their preeminence of central bank policy shows how much responsibility and burden central banks have taken on. Problem is, nobody knows exactly how central banks will exit from this unprecedented monetary stimulus, or what they will exit into. What the BIS is sure of is that central bank stop-gap measures are reaching their limits, and are now warning that “more bond buying would (actually) retard the global economy’s return to health by delaying adjustments to governments’ and households’ balance sheets. In other words, the central bankers’ bank is now making the same warnings about excessive monetary policy as QE skeptics have been making for some time. 
According to “Making the Most of Borrowed Time”, by Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the BIS; “Six years have passed since the eruption of the global financial crisis, yet robust, self-sustaining, well balanced growth still eludes the global economy. If there were an easy path to that goal, we would have found it by now.” The conclusion is “central banks need to begin heading for the exits and stop trying to spur global recovery”. 
Why? The bottom line is that monetary stimulus alone simply cannot provide the answer. The roots of the problem are not monetary. Central banks cannot repair the balance sheets of households and financial institutions, cannot ensure the sustainability of fiscal finances, and most of all cannot enact the structural economic and financial reforms; all needed to return economies to real growth paths. To be fair, without these forceful and determined policy responses, the global financial system could easily have collapsed, bringing the world economy down with it. Thus monetary policy has done its part, and real recovery now requires a different policy mix, one with more emphasis on strengthening economic flexibility and dynamism and stabilizing public finances. 
In Addition to a Dysfunctional Money Multiplier and Depressed Velocity of Money, the Keynesian Multiplier is also Dysfunctional 
The chart from GaveKal below shows clearly just how clueless the “don’t worry about the debt, just add more Keynesian stimulus” crowd are. The chart shows that the marginal efficiency of public debt, at least in the US (public spending in emerging markets from a low base usually improves productivity) has been declining structurally since 1981. Further, it seems that this marginal efficiency has now reached a negative level, i.e., more debt is just not going to cut it.
Hat Tip: John Mauldin
Significant Tail Risk? 
The implications of both the BIS observations and the Gavekal points about the Keynesian multiplier are that BOTH fiscal and monetary policy are near their limits in terms of having an actual positive impact on the real economy. Simply stated, the real role being played by central banks is becoming more of a confidence game than statistically demonstrable positive effect. In reality, the pace of repair and reconstruction is now up to the private sector, not government fiscal or central bank monetary policy. Real economies remain burdened with heavy debt loads and impaired balance sheets. While unprecedentedly unconventional monetary policy that has tried to alleviate/prevent the pain of adjustment, the recovery in the real economy continues to significant lag that in the financial markets. 
This “bubble” central bank stimulus bubble component in asset prices implies significant tail risk if investors ever lose faith in the ability of central banks to at least provide a backstop. Should this faith dissipate, it could get ugly very quickly, such as a dramatic surge in financial repressed bond yields causing crippling, systemic losses, amounting to trillions of dollars for bond and stock investors around the globe, to the tune of 8% of GDP (or more than USD1 trillion if yields were to rise by 3 percentage points across the maturity spectrum). In Japan the potential losses would be a mind-blowing 35% of GDP. Losses in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom would range from about 15% of GDP. In the understatement of the century, the BIS concludes, “interest rate increases pose risks to the stability of the financial system if not executed with great care”. 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has likened monetary policy to landing a jet on an aircraft carrier; i.e., at lot could go wrong between “unlimited QE” and the eventual exit. Bouts of positive correlation of equities, bonds and commodities, suggest that extraordinary monetary stimulus has created bubbles in a broad range of financial assets. Any untoward removal of said stimulus could therefore create a tail event in which prices of all assets dramatically go down. 
Let’s hope that Chairman Ben and other central bankers are humble enough to realize the real short-comings of monetary policy, while at the same time are politically savvy enough to continue playing the confidence game–i.e., being brutally honest and telling investors/businesses that there is nothing further they can do is not the message that should be sent. 
Just How Much “Fundamental” Support is there for Stock Prices? 
Academics who have analyzed the historical relationship between GDP growth and stock price performance across developed and developing country markets find a very tenuous correlation between GDP and aggregate stock prices that is typically quite low and even negative. O’Shaughnessy Asset Management is among others who say the correlation between aggregate GDP and stock prices is non-existent… EXCEPT that you would historically earned a 21% one-year return if you invested when GDP is less than zero percent! By the same token, investing when consumer confidence is below normal produces average five year annualized returns of 11.5%, but the correlation is zero looking one year out. 
However, a significant relationship can be found between equity returns and expected GDP growth. By the same token, market returns are unrelated to past earnings, but are influenced by changes in expected returns, expected cash flows and expected discount rates. Callagn, Murphy, Parkash and Qian (Journal of Investing, 2009) show stock prices to be a function of long-term earnings forecasts, while stock prices reflect not only the average of the IBES long-term earnings predictions but also some superior forecasting power beyond that aggregated average prediction. 
The bottom line therefore is that stock prices are driven by changes in investor expectations and perceptions of future “fundamentals” (e.g., GDP growth, earnings, discount rates). These changes are hard if not impossible to objectively measure. 
Market Conditions Now are not “Normal” 
Despite the dire warnings of debt deflation cassandras, realistic investors must accept that the Keynesians and monetarists, who generally foresee a 1930s-style slump unless the economy is stimulated out of it, are in charge. Rather than repeatedly pounding the table about the errors of Keynesian/monetarist ways, investors must accept that the world’s central banks will continue pumping dump truck loads of fiat money to ensure their economies do not fall into a deflationary spiral. Basically, the deflationists are forecasting an event that happened five years ago, when the worst fears of a 1930s-style slump was disproved by massive monetary intervention. 
This does not mean the post 2008 slump is over: far from it. But it is more realistic to assume the nightmare cycle of falling asset prices becoming self-feeding and a dash for cash has already been prevented. On the other hand, the massive central bank debt monetization IS eroding confidence in government and ultimately its paper fiat money, and this, we believe, is behind the world-wide rush into physical gold despite the crash in paper gold prices.


Source: 4-Traders.com
No Sell in May and Go Away this Year? 
The news flow about economic growth is not as good as investors were expecting a couple of months ago. Risk markets reacted negatively to the generally weak April global PMIs (purchasing manager indices), particularly those for Germany and China. Instead of triggering a selloff, however, bad PMIs, particularly Eurozone composite PMI where a sub-50 reading indicated a recessionary a drop in activity for the nineteenth time in the past 20 months, only led investors to expect further monetary easing in the Eurozone. 
                            

US business cycle and survey-based surprise indicators have plunged. Further, the lower highs being made in these indicators of the business cycle suggest the spillover effects of QE are also disappointing.

Source: Bloomberg, Hat-Tip: Zero Hedge
Yet Stock Prices Continue to Grid Higher 
Yet investor confidence that the Fed, ECB and the BoJ “have their back” remains strong, despite ample evidence that central banks are still largely pushing on a string in getting massive monetary base money to circulate into the “real” economy, as evidenced by the money multiplier and velocity of money. As we have repeatedly argued, quantitative easing can help keep financial systems/banks afloat in the immediate aftermath of a financial crisis by backstopping bank balance sheets and acting as the lender of last resort. But in a liquidity trap, not only can the Fed not control the money supply (M2) and the money multiplier, it can’t control the velocity of money either. And that means the Fed alone can’t create rising aggregate demand as long as the transfer mechanism (money multiplier) between the monetary base and M2 remains broken/dysfunctional. In this regard, the notion that the Federal Reserve is “printing money” is false, at least as regards “real” as opposed to “monetary” money supply. While the Fed expanded the monetary base (currency (notes & coins) in circulation + commercial bank deposits at the central bank) from $840 billion to $2.93 trillion (+249%), year- over- year expansion of M2 is recently only 6.8%…Ergo, the empirical evidence is clear that high- powered money is not causing a corresponding increase in “real economy” money.

Source: FRED
While a 1930s-Style Debt Deflation Has Been Averted, Has a Japan-Like Malaise Also Been Averted? 
Given massive central bank intervention, the nightmare cycle of falling asset prices becoming self-feeding and a dash for cash has already been prevented. But the jury is still out whether a Japan-like decades-long malaise has also been prevented.


Source: Bank of Japan
Inflation Expectations are Still Falling 
The great rotation from bonds into stocks that was all the rage just a couple of months ago is not. The St. Louis Fed’s 10-year inflation forecast based on the yield spread in 10yr treasuries (nominal) less inflation-indexed notes shows a sharp drop-off, leading to lower, not higher bond yields. The much feared monetary tsunami-inflation link has yet to be seen.


Hat Tip: Capital Spectator
But Government Sector Intervention IS Supporting Positive Total Credit Growth 
Yet while central banks continue pushing on the perverbial string, the U.S. economy IS growing, albeit anemically. The following chart tracks the YoY change in total credit creation in the US. During and after the financial crisis, credit provided by the financial sector plunged, and is still declining YoY. If this were the only source of credit, the US economy would still be in recession. Fortunately, the credit “hole” in the financial sector was plugged by the government sector, allowing positive, but tepid, growth to continue.


Source: FRED
The Fed has been able to influence risk appetite and inflation expectations with QE, and by goosing risk asset prices, has supported the economy through its own version of “trickle down”. On the other hand, total credit IS growing. Thus instead of looking at the monetary base and the money supply, investors should follow the trend in total credit creation as the gauge of real support for the economy.
Source: FRED
Is the S&P 500 and US Stocks on the Verge of a 1970’s Breakout Moment? 
As previously mentioned, stock prices continue to grind higher, to pre 2008 crisis levels. The central bank “puts” undoubtedly have set a floor under downside risk, but is this the only factor driving stock prices? We suspect not. Since the 2009 low, the bears have been consistently wrong. In other words, the stock market is acting like it`s in a secular bull, not bear market. As Ralph Acampora states, “the low, in March of 2009, was a generational low. Part one of a secular bull market, this period that we’re in, is led by investor disbelief and fear.” 
Firstly, as mentioned, there is the renewed growth in total credit. While the degree of recovery is debatable, the surge in housing stocks, the expectation is that housing is on the mend and again positively contributing to growth instead of detracting from it. In addition, Exxon says the energy renaissance in the U.S. will continue and predicts that North America will become a net exporter of oil and gas by the middle of the next decade. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) reckons that imported liquid fuels as a share of total U.S. liquid fuel use reached 60% in 2005, dipped below 50% in 2010 and fell further to 45% in 2011, and should further decline to 34% in 2019, while the International Energy Agency (IEA) projects the U.S. could leapfrog Saudi Arabia and Russia to become the world’s biggest oil producer by 2020, and a net oil exporter by 2030. This represents a major watershed event for the U.S. economy. 
The U.S. stock market is already looking much stronger than past modern-era bear markets adjusted for inflation.
Hat Tip: DShort
When Will the Great Japan Trade Run Out of Gas? 
In case you haven’t been paying attention, the Japanese stock market is on an epic run. The Nikkei 225 is up 60% since last November when government officials began hinting at big policy changes that have since come to be known as “Abenomics”. As previously stated, academic research indicates that market returns are unrelated to past earnings/economic performance, which is what most of the economic data and earnings announcements represent, i.e., past performance. The real drivers of stock prices are changes in expected returns, expected cash flows and expected discount rates. 
From the dramatic reaction in JPY exchange rates and Japan equity benchmark indices, you’d think that something had not just changed, but that we’re looking at a new economy entirely. Within the realm of investor expectations, that is exactly what has happened. Bloomberg’s William Pesek and other skeptics are asking “where is the beef?” in Abenomics and points to a disconnect between perception and reality. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Pesek and others don’t get the importance of expectations vis-à-vis reality, aka George Soro’s Theory of Reflexivity. In the modern “financial” economy, changing (this time entrenched) expectations is half the battle. 
In the long 20-year Mother of all Bear markets malaise, Japanese stocks have seen many virulent but brief surges in stock prices, as is shown in the chart below, in of the prior cases, however, the government and BoJ were never able to “permanently” change investor and business expectations, and the economy as well as financial markets repeatedly slipped back into lethargy and lower prices. Even the Koizumi reforms, which produced the best rebound (over 100% in total) to date, eventually fizzled.


Hat Tip: Pragmatic Capitalism
In its latest Japan survey, the OECD forecasts the Japanese economy will grow by about 1.5% annually in 2013 and 2014, and hails Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s three-pronged strategy — bold monetary policy, flexible fiscal policy and a growth strategy – as a plan to end 15 years of deflation and reviving economic growth. 
Yes, Japan’s gross public debt reached 220% of GDP in 2012, the highest level ever recorded in the OECD area, while the budget deficit is hovering around 10% of GDP, and “it remains critically important for Japan to address extremely high and still rising levels of government debt and other challenges posed by its ageing population,” as pointed out by the OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría. The OECD also has also correctly emphasized that Japan needs to use regulatory reform to boost sustainable growth; particularly in the agriculture sector. The OECD believes Japan can create a more competitive agriculture sector by promoting consolidation of farmland to boost productivity, phasing out supply control measures, and shifting to less distorting forms of government support. Other potentially effective reforms include a) promotion of “green” growth and restructuring of the energy sector and b) increased women’s as well as older worker participation in the labor force to maximize its human resources. Reforming the tax and social security system, encouraging better work-life balance, and increasing the availability of affordable childcare would go a long way in this direction. 
Break Above 18,000 Would Represent a Real Change of Trend 
While the Nikkei 225 has already seen a parabolic move off historical lows, it would have to break up decisively through the Koizumi-era high of over 18,000 to represent a real change of direction from the market secular downtrend since the 1989 historical high.

Source: Big Charts, JapanInvestor
Japan “passers” such as Pragmatic Capitalism’s Cullen Roche initially dismissed the BoJ’s no-holds-barred QE as a ponzi scheme, but are now openly wondering, “what if monetary policy is much more powerful outside of a BSR (balance sheet recession) than we presume? By the same token, if the Abenomics bold experiment (which is basically the Fed’s playbook on steroids) actually works, what does that imply for the eventual outcome of the Fed’s monetary blasphemy? 
JPY is Far From All-Out Collapse Territory 
Axel Merk of Merk Investments as well as others (most notably Kyle Bass) insist that the BoJ’s monetary blasphemy and the governments “depression era” fiscal policy will render JPY “worthless”. We would counter that JPY is merely in the process of returning to a pre-financial crisis trading range. 
As seen in the chart below, the snap-back from a historical low versus USD in 1995 was just a rapid, but did not represent a secular trend change. As JPY/USD has yet to even reach prior highs in the late 1990s and early 2000, or even exceed the psychologically important JPY100/USD, it is way to early to declare JPY has permanently collapsed. 
Further, as Stephen Jen of SLJ Macro Partners has pointed out, it is Japanese investors, not global hedge funds, that will determine JPY eventual fate.


Source: 4-Traders.com
All that Japan really needed to revive its export competitiveness was a 30% currency depreciation, such as was enjoyed by its rival South Korea, whose exports and companies suddenly appeared unassailably competitive versus Japan following a 30% depreciation in the Won. 
Revived export competitiveness notwithstanding, investors are rushing into domestic reflation plays, with surging high beta broker/dealers and real estate stocks leading, and the export sectors to follow after global demand more clearly recovers.
Abenomics vs Koizumi Rally

Source: TSE, JapanInvestor



Investors are Dumping Inflation Hedges
The noticeable shift in sentiment suggests the market may be approaching a breaking point where investors give up on the notion that the economic recovery is accelerating and/or that inflationary pressures are rising.
Since global financial stability slowing continues to improve (as confirmed by recent IMF statements), what we are talking here is not another look into the abyss, but a reality check, where “excessive” investor expectations for growth and inflation are again squeezed out of market prices. While “acute” global financial stability risks have been reduced, the Eurozone has an ongoing debt and credit problem that is suffocating economic growth and thus corporate and bank balance sheet repair in the region remains spotty and uneven, leaving a sword of economic and financial stability hanging over the region. The following are some yellow flags that markets (investors) are beginning to “smell” deflation.
Yellow Flag 1: Investors dumped their holdings of TIPs (Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities) last week following a weak auction of 5-year notes. Falling prices prompted a spike in yields on the TIPS, which ostensibly hedge against inflation. Traders observed that, “the rest of the TIPs market is having a mini implosion since the auction, as real yields on TIPs have jumped 8-10bps across the curve in what appears to be a ‘get me out’ trade. The spread between the yield on TIPS and the yield on plain vanilla Treasurys, or break-even rate, which dictates the rate of inflation necessary for TIPS to provide a better return, has been in free fall. Before the auction, the rate was at roughly 2.24%.
Yellow Flag 2: Commodity prices are selling off. While the financial media was focused on the first weakness then sharp selloff in gold, significant selling was also underway in other commodities more closely linked with the real economy. The CRB index has quickly sold off some 7.9% from a 2012 high and is still over 24% lower than its 2011 post-crisis high. Copper has recently sold off just under 14% and is 30% lower than its post-crisis high, while crude oil (Brent) has sold off over 11% and is also about 24% below its post-crisis high.
In the week ended April 9, investors unloaded the equivalent of about 20 million barrels of oil in U.S. petroleum contracts, according to the CFTC’s Commitments of Traders data. Bloomberg data indicate indicate hedge funds and other money managers cut their bullish bets on Brent to their lowest level in four months, while a separate survey by Bloomberg shows investors expecting US crude supplies to hit a 23-year high of over 390 mm/bbl.
Since bottoming in October 2012, inventory levels of copper have risen 190% in warehouses operated by the London Metals Exchange. That’s a huge and rapid increase, and it conveys a powerful message about the future for copper prices. We are seeing an even more rapid rise in inventory levels than when global demand collapsed in 2008, and it comes on just a small amount of drop in copper prices. 
Yellow Flag 3: Great rotation not. Despite all the talk of the “great rotation” from bonds to stocks, global bond yields have taken another leg downward, with the German 10yr bund recently falling 50bps to 1.25%, the 10yr US treasury dropping 38bps to 1.68% and of course Japan’s 10yr dropping 39bps to historical lows at 0.45%. Even Spain’s 10yr bond yield continues to decline, by a large 238bps to 4.64% from July 2012 highs. Falling bond yields of course are another hint of shrinking growth expectations and/or shrinking inflation expectations.
Yellow Flag 4: Emerging markets have been underperforming by a widening margin since late 2012, ostensibly because of softening economic data, weakening commodity prices and slowing capital flows.
The Gold Crash Whodunit
The $20 billion gold futures sale and concentrated selling of gold futures on the US COMEX on Friday and Monday has gold bugs shouting “conspiracy” as they smelled manipulative selling by a large hedge fund, bullion bank or even the Fed, behind the crash. The CFTC is scrutinizing whether gold prices are being manipulated, although they public state that the drop doesn’t necessarily mean “anything nefarious”. The CFTC said in March that it is looking at issues including whether the setting of prices for gold—and the smaller silver market — is transparent and if it is fixed.  Blackrock said it sawno visible central bank activity” although the reported sale of (USD400 mm) gold by Cyprus was supposedly one trigger for the selloff.
Selling of paper gold ETFs backed by real gold probably accelerated the move. This is because GLD shares are dumped at a quicker pace than gold’s own selloff, creating an excess supply of GLD shares, forcing GLD administrators to buy up this excess supply, and raising cash to do this by selling gold bullion. According to Zeal LLC, the recent “correction” in GLD’s holdings forced it to dump a staggering 169.8 tons (5.5 million ounces) of gold bullion simply to keep GLD shares’ price tracking gold! There are only two gold-mining companies in the entire world (Barrick and Newmont) that produce that much gold in a whole year. The drop capped a trend of declining global gold investment (including bars, coins and ETPs), as the World Gold Council saw an 8.3% drop to 424.7 tons in 4th QTR 2012.
George Soros and Louis Moore Bacon reportedly cut their stakes in gold ETF products last quarter, for Soros by 55% as of December 2012. Once heavily long gold, hedge funds reportedly cut bets on a gold rally by 56% since the yellow metal reached a 13-month high last October. As hedge funds headed for the exits, the investment banks turned bearish. SocGendeclared the gold era was over and set an end 2013 target of USD1,375, near the time that Citigroup declared the end was nigh for global oil demand growth (on substitution natural gas for oil combined with increasing fuel economy).
Goldman set a year end target of USD1,450 and said it could go lower, then nailed the selloff with  a “short gold” recommendation a week before gold really tanked. This selling came amidst a consensus among economists that economic growth would accelerate in the U.S. and China in the coming quarters, according to Bloomberg and other surveys.
Gold has Lost its Safe Haven Status?
Soros total the South China Morning Post, “Gold has disappointed the public”…”when the Euro was close to collapsing in the last year…gold was destroyed as a safe haven, proved to be unsafe…Gold is very volatile on a day-to-day basis with no trend on a longer-term basis.” While Soros was long gold big time until fairly recently, he called gold “the ultimate bubble” in February 2010, implying he would enjoy the momentum ride until the music stops.

It is puzzling that gold crashed just as the BoJ was unleashing its “shock and awe” monetary expansion that will double Japan’s monetary base from Y138tn or 29% of GDP at the end of 2012 to Y270tn or about 54% of GDP by the end of 2014. This compares to a US monetary base expansion of 6% GDP in mid-2008 to 19% of GDP by this March. The BoJ’s increase in balance sheet of Y5.2tn (US$54bn) per month in 2013 is the equivalent of annualised 13% of 2012 GDP, or roughly twice the Fed’s current balance sheet expansion, at annualized 6.5% of 2012 US GDP.
If the real reason for the gold crash ends up being “rogue” shorts by Goldman, Morgan Stanley or JPM, etc. traders swinging for the fences that eventually blows up in their face, we may have a more serious problem than realized.
Source: 4-Traders.com
Is the Recovery Bull Market Already Long in the Tooth?
Looking at every bull market in the US since 1871, the historical “average” bull market lasted 50 months, with a media gain of 123.8%. The range since 1970 however has been substantial, from 32 to 153 months in duration, and gains ranging from 56.6% to over 516%. There is of course no way of knowing whether this bull market will be a short one or a long one, but coming out of the 1930s depression, there were no less than four bull markets ranging from 140% to 413% gains. For our money, this bull market is reaching a historical median milestone has no particular significance. 

Hat Tip: Big Picture

Economic Surprise Index Turns Negative 
In addition to the disappearing inflation premium in TIPs, we believe the negative turn in Citigroup’s Economic Surprise Index is having an impact…i.e., investor expectations were overshooting what it now appears the recovery is able to deliver. This is a marked contrast from the June 2012 to November 2012 period, when investor expectations were low and the economic data was surprising on the upside despite investor concern about the Eurozone and the US budget impasse. Given that US sequestration has kicked in, know one should really be surprised that the US economic data is looking “squishy”. 
The March US jobs report (which came in at just 88K) was an example of disappointing weakness, accompanied by some weak U.S. housing and retail data. Building permits have declined since January. Single family starts were down 4.8%. Homebuilder confidence, which climbed to its highest level (47) since 2006 in December, stalled in January 2013 after an eight-month rise and fell to 42 in April. Foreclosure starts have also begun to pick up again.
Source: Citigroup

The IMF Lowers its (Too Optimistic) Global Growth Forecast 

The IMF lowered its 2013 global growth forecast, to 3.3% from 3.5% and its 2014 forecast to 4.0% from 4.1%, reflecting, 
a) Sharp fiscal spending cuts in the U.S. (sequestration, etc.) should shave about 0.3 percentage points from US GDP this year, 
b) Struggling, recession-striken Europe, with economic contractions in France, Spain and Italy expected this year. 
c) With the IMF was upbeat on China, mediocre growth here is sparking concerns that growth is slowing. 
d) The good news was that the IMF raised its forecast for Japan, ostensibly on the BoJ’s aggressive new monetary stimulus. 
To IMF cynics, these downward revisions haven’t gone far enough, particularly as regards expected inflation. 
US Commerce Board Suggests US Economy Has “Lost Some Steam” 
The economy “has lost some steam” and will grow slowly in the near term, the Conference Board said Thursday as it reported that its leading economic index ticked down in March. The LEI declined 0.1% last month, following three months of gains, and economists polled by MarketWatch had expected the index to rise 0.2% in March. In February, the LEI rose 0.5%. The largest negative contribution came from consumers’ expectations. Other negative contributions came from building permits, a manufacturing new-orders index, weekly manufacturing hours and weekly jobless claims. 
Goldman Sachs’ Business Cycle Indicator Goes from Bad to Worse 
The latest Goldman GLI (global leading indicator) shows that the situation has gone from bad to worse. Consumer confidence, global PMIs, and industrial metals have all worsened significantly, pushing the Global Leading Indicator momentum down. Goldman’s GLI also points to future deterioration in global industrial production. 
Hat Tip: Zero Hedge

The Spring Equities Swoon Revisited 

The disconnect was that while the economic data flow was increasingly falling below expectations, bond yields were falling not rising, the TIPs inflation premium was shrinking, and commodities were selling off, the S&P 500 was blithely ignoring this in hitting a new rebound high.

Over the past several years, investors have repeated a pattern of beginning the year with optimistic U.S. growth/recovery expectations, only for these expectations to evaporate by mid-year as waning data suggest sluggish activity, which has contributed to a “sell in April-May” and go away pattern in stock prices as investors fretted about a) a possible end to QE, b) sputtering economic growth and c) ongoing Eurozone crisis. 
Yet, in “selling in May and going away”, investors would have missed most of the next up-leg that took the S&P 500 to new recovery highs, with the entire move from the March 2009 low of 683.38 now representing a 132% gain over a period of just over four years. This time, the correction could be essentially the same, i.e., basically a reality check that does not seriously endanger the post great recession, QE fueled market recovery. While the apocalyptic bears are still out there, their hyperbole is somehow less believable than in 2011 or 2012.
Source: Yahoo.com, JapanInvestor
Short-Term Breakdown in S&P 500 
In addition to the yellow flags previously mentioned, cracks are forming in the S&P 500 rally itself. 
The S&P 500 index is recently unable to close back above its 50-day moving average. This is the first close below this key price level in 2013 as high-beta Tech (AAPL) and Homebuilders underperformed notably. Stocks are below Cyprus levels and marginally above Italian election levels. 
Hat Tip: Zero Hedge
The Trend is Still Your Friend 
The so-called momentum effect is one of the strongest and most pervasive phenomena of any market phenomenon studied. Researchers have verified its value with many different asset classes, as well as across groups of assets. The momentum effect works in terms of asset’s performance relative to its peers in predicting future relative performance, and momentum also works well on an absolute, or time series basis, where an asset’s own past return predicts its future performance. In absolute momentum, there is significant positive auto-covariance between an asset’s return next month and its past one-year excess return. Absolute momentum appears to be just as robust and universally applicable as crosssectional momentum. It performs well in extreme market environments, across multiple asset classes (commodities, equity indices, bond markets, currency pairs), and back in time to the turn of the century.
In short, the trend is your friend until, like was seen in gold, it is decisively broken. 
Foreign Investors Pile Into Japan
Having ignited a virulent “short yen, long Nikkei trade”, Shinzo Abe and his BoJ buddies continue playing the market psychology game to the hilt, knowing that a change in consumer, corporate and investor sentiment can be just as good as “real” change through what George Soros termed reflexivity.  Japanese policymakers know full well that public expectation of more deflation can become self-fulfilling, and they are actively trying to change the way ordinary Japanese think about prices, just as they have engineered a dramatic turnaround in foreign investor sentiment. 
They see the fight against deflation not just as one that involves measures like quantitative easing, but also psychic warfare: Once Japan’s consumers and business leaders believe prices will start rising, there’s a better chance people will go out and spend, putting pressure on prices to go up. 
Ryuzo Miyao, a member of the Bank of Japan’s policy board, has actually said that deflation will end in the current fiscal year (to March 2014). “The achievement of 1 percent inflation in fiscal 2014 has come into sight,” Miyao said. “The public’s inflation expectations will rise gradually, and in this situation the inflation rate is likely to rise above 1% during fiscal 2014.”
While Piling In, They Also Discuss Possible Loss of Control By the BoJ
For many years very underweight and generally very pessimistic about Japan, foreign investors have piled into Japanese equities since November of last year, and this buying accelerated to a record weekly figure last week, according to the Tokyo Stock Exchange. A new net buying record of JPY1.58 trillion was set in the second week of April, after the Bank of Japan unveiled new “shock and awe” quantitative and qualitative easing measures under newly installed Governor Haruhiko Kuroda. The new data put cumulative net purchasing by foreign investors since mid-November, when the decision to dissolve the lower house was made, at JPY8.15 trillion.

Source: Nikkei Astra, Tokyo Stock Exchange, Japan Investor
JPY Billion

At the same time, they continue to discuss the probability that the Bank of Japan (BoJ) would lose control of the printing press and how a rapidly declining yen could lead to a replay of the 1997 Asian currency debacle. Perma bear Albert Edwards points out that investors may have forgotten that yen weakness was one of the immediate causes of the 1997 Asian currency crisis and Asia’s subsequent economic collapse. 

Japan Becomes Extremely Overbought
Regardless of whether the big Abenomics/BoJ bet eventually pans out, the following chart from Orcam Financial shows the Nikkei as the most overbought (i.e., above its 200-day MA) and Gold the most oversold, suggesting there is now ample room for a short-term mean reversion trade between the two (like short Nikkei, long gold), and this big contrarian call is exactly what CLSA strategist Chris Wood is now suggesting.
Hat Tip: Pragmatic Capitalism
The call is predicated on the non-belief that the US economy is “normalizing” and US QE will come to an end earlier than what investors currently expect. Indeed, it counts on the conjecture that the BoJ’s bold move on QE is not the last by a long shot. For one, Mario Draghi at the the ECB would love to do more if he thought he could get it by Germany. Support for this view comes from three regional Fed bank presidents saying a further decline in US inflation below the Fed’s 2% target may signal a need for more accomodation, not a potential curtailing of easing discussed by other Fed officials. 
Other brokers are beginning to suggest the Topix/Nikkei 225 is due for a 10% or so pause from the parabolic move upward since November of last year. In looking at individual stocks and sectors like Sumitomo Realty (8830.T) and the real estate sector as a whole, prices have already surged to Koizumi reform years peak levels, meaning a lot of the expected reflation for the foreseeable future is already priced in, given that Sumitomo Realty for example is already selling at a very rich P/E of 43X and a PBR of over 4X.

The Japan equity rally has been driven primarily by Nikkei 225 constituents, i.e., larger cap, more liquid names that foreign investors found the easiest to quickly raise their Japan exposure. However, the core 30, which includes more than its share of troubled electronic sector and other “dogs” continues to lag by a considerable margin. 
Source: Nikkei Astra, Japan Investor

The best year-to-date performers in the Nikkei 225 include many real estate companies, both first and second-tier, major retailers, second-tier financials, heavy industry stocks and even a couple of pharmaceutical companies.

Over the past month, however, buying has gone from “all in” to more specific sector and stock selection, amidst continued selling by domestic financial institutions who see this as an ideal time to unload unwanted strategic holdings. The biggest irony is that the electric power “zombies” are on the leader board. while the bank sector has taken a breather. The growing sector divergence is indicative of the emergence of quick sector rotation
Source: Tokyo Stock Exchange, Japan Investor

Japan’s Nikkei 225 has gone parabolic and JPY has plunged since the Abe Administration began promoting reflation, and was given added momentum by a very aggressive new BoJ chief. This has caused foreign investors to sit up and take notice.

FT Advisor carried an article called “Fund managers call the end of Japan’s ‘lost decade’” based on the BoJ’s surprise “shock and awe” aggressive monetary easing aimed at jolting Japan out of structural deflation. “This is a significant moment for Japan and I think this is the end of the lost decade. It is a break with the past and the landscape is changing,” said Simon Callow, manager of the CF Miton Diversified Growth. Scott Spencer, senior portfolio manager on the Aberdeen multi-manager team, said: “A lot of people have killed their careers calling a new dawn for Japan. It’s clearly a positive move but there is a long way to go.”…as quoted by the FT article. 

New BoJ governor Haruhiko Kuroda has made a bold bet that a massive expansion in Japan’s monetary base (narrow money supply = banknotes in circulation + coins in circulation + private sector bank current account deposits at the bank of Japan) will dispel deeply a deeply embedded deflation mindset in Japan and encourage private sector banks to create credit by loaning funds to corporations and individuals, as these corporations and individuals begin spending hoarded cash savings for new plant and equipment as well as personal consumption/housing investment. 
Source: Diapason Hat Tip: Zero Hedge
Japan’s Chronic Liquidity Trap: Credit Creation Drives the Economy, Not the Monetary Base
As announced, the BoJ plans to buy up to JPY50 trillion of JGBs of all maturities per year and expand its total monetary base by JPY60~JPY70 trillion, with purchases of JGBs, ETF (exchange traded stock funds) and J-REITs. Since annual general account JGB issuance is some JPY42~JPY43 trillion, the BoJ will be essentially funding more than the annual issuance of budget deficit-covering bonds with these purchases. 
As seen in the above comparison of the trend in Japan’s monetary base versus M1 and M2 (basically cash currency in circulation and bank deposits), the increase in M1 and M2 has not kept up with the increase in Japan’s monetary base…i.e., the money/liquidity supplied by the BoJ is not filtering into the “real” economy in the form of increased deposits (loans)…meaning the BoJ continues to basically push on a string. In other words, the BoJ has been caught in what is referred to as a liquidity trap going on two decades.  
Japan’s first experiment with QE (quantitative easing) is not encouraging. During Japan’s first experiment with QE between March 2001 and March 2006, the ratio of M1 and M2 and Japan’s monetary base dropped sharply, as the increase in monetary base was not matched by a corresponding increase in M1 and M2. In other words, Japan’s first QE had virtually no visible impact except to shore up the balance sheets of private sector “zombie” banks as the private sector continued to deleverage. JGB yields did not rise and indeed declined until Q2 2003, or until investors realized that the worst of Japan’s banking crisis was ending, and the Nikkei 225 remained negative versus the start of QE 1 until 2005 or after the Koizumi reforms were well under way. Thus it was the recovery in growth expectations, not QE, that was driving financial markets, while both CPI and corporate service prices continued to see mild deflation.

Sources: Bank of Japan, Nikkei, JapanInvestor

The Grand Monetary Experiment Could Turn Out to be More Like a Damp Squid than the Disaster JPY Bears Predict

While shocking for its boldness vis-a-vis years of ultraconservative BoJ monetary policy in that it is even larger than the “helicopter Ben” Fed’s QE in relative terms, the target value of ~60% of GDP does no more than match that achieved by the supposed monetary guardian Swiss National Bank. So far, the Fed has not blown up the US with its monetary policy QE blasphemy, and neither have the Swiss. Rather than blowing up the bond market, Tokyo’s irresponsible monetary behavior could turn out to be little more than a damp squid. 

At the end of the day, it is credit creation through the private sector, not the monetary base, that is the real driver of the economy


The Public Debt, Private Sector Surplus Identity

The irony is that, while the Japanese government falls deeper and deeper into debt, the financial surpluses in the private sector, i.e., among companies and individuals, have never been higher, as corporations and individuals hoard cash. The whole object of the exercise with the BoJ’s unprecedented QE is precisely to get companies and individuals to spend that money and get this money circulating in the real economy instead of sitting as cash on the balance sheets of financial institutions. QE didn’t work in 2001~2006 because the private sector was still in deleveraging. In other words, while the government is running a financial deficit of +/-10% GDP, individuals and corporations are running financial surpluses of +/-5% GDP, respectively. In other words, financial surpluses in the private sector (depository institutions, non-financial corporations and households) have been running about three times the level of general government deficits, leaving enough room to cover general government deficits AND invest significant amounts of this excess savings overseas.

Source: BoJ Flow of Funds: Private Sector vs General Government

Consequently, even if the BoJ dramatically increases its holdings of JGBs, domestic financial institutions will still be the major holders of Japanese government debt. On the other hand, if the government were to run down its financial deficit to GDP, individual and corporate financial surpluses would decline by corresponding amounts. 

Source: Diapason Hat Tip: Zero Hedge
Limits to How Far the BoJ Can Depreciate JPY?
Implicit in the BoJ’s monetary program is the downward pressure exerted on the external value of JPY. While the Abe Administration and BoJ has been very explicit in saying it wants a significantly lower JPY, Japan’s trading partners, most prominently the US Treasury (in a semiannual report), has warned japan not to hold down the value of its currency merely to gain a competitive advantage in world markets.
Those who carefully examine history in terms of FDR’s efforts to reflate the US economy and Japan’s Koreikyo Takahashi’s efforts to reflate Japan in the 1930s will notice that a major, if not the real factor in reflating these economies in the 1930s was a substantially weaker currency…by some 40% in the US and a similar amount in Japan. Now, such dramatic devaluations would be met with high alarm, not only from Japan’s trading partners, but also from investors seeing a JPY and fearing a fiscal crash. 
A further weakening in JPY to the JPY124/USD level would only leave JPY where it was before the 2008 financial crisis, i.e., before global trade collapsed and Japanese exporters were on a role from strong China demand. Now, China demand is mediocre at best, and Japan’s electronic exporters have been gravely wounded by the competition. 
Since we believe a 30% depreciation in JPY (especially a significant weakening in JPY’s real effective rate) would do wonders for Japan’s export competitiveness, we don’t buy the conjecture that Japan’s new-found balance of trade deficit is “permanent”. While investors currently have a hard time visualizing Japan’s export sectors immediately returning to their former (pre-crisis) glory. Interestingly, Japan’s real effective exchange rate has dropped even faster than JPY/USD, to levels approaching the 20-year low seen in 2007. While exports cannot be expected to trend like they did in 2007 amidst booming global trade, Japan has already recovered a significant amount of real effective exchange rate competitiveness. 
Source: Bank of Japan
Major Domestic Reflation Plays Have Already Hit Koizumi Bull Market Highs
Rather than the exporters, which still have global demand and tough competition issues, foreign investors have headed straight for domestic reflation plays, creating dramatic rallies in these stocks. The parabolic move in these stocks however is making us cautious. Take Sumitomo Realty & Development (8830.T, Reuters), for example. During the Koizumi mini property bubble, SRD’s stock surged some five-fold between 2005 and 2007, completely leaving other “high beta” sectors like the broker/dealers in the dust. This time, SRD has surged 3.8-fold and is back to the prior JPY5,000 high in just one year, with almost no pauses in between. 
On the other hand, the electronic equipment majors like Sony (6758.T), Panasonic (6752.T) and even Toyota (7203.T) have merely rebounded from prior lows, with only Toyota matching the surge in the Nikkei 225.  For the Nikkei 225 or the Topix to seriously challenge the Koizumi era high of over 18,000, the market will need some serious participation from the export sector as well as the financial sector, which occupy a large chunk of the indices.  
With the big reflation play already well underway, any pause in JPY/USD depreciation or doubts about the efficacy of the BoJ’s big plan could trigger short-term profit taking. And, in the final analysis, whether this is the end of Japan’s lost decade or not is not really up to the BoJ, but the biggest missing piece so far, which is the reforms piece. The Koizumi rally was big on reforms with support from the BoJ but with a contractionary fiscal policy. Abenomics ostensibly has both expansionary fiscal policy, extraordinary monetary policy, and reform policy, but the real commitment to reforms is questionable, as the Koizumi reforms (to which Abe in his first stint as prime minister was Koizumi’s heir) in the end died on the vine from intensified political resistance. 
Source: Yahoo.co.jp
Source: Yahoo.co.jp

The BoJ’s “Shock and Awe” Unconventional Monetary Policy Experiment
Despite new LDP prime minister Shinzo Abe and his “Abenomics” road show creating a high expectations hurdle for his newly installed BoJ team, new BoJ governor Kuroda has come out swinging with “shock and awe” monetary policy that sent already rock-bottom 10yr JGB yields plunging from 55bps to 34bps, and the Nikkei 225 surging 6.75% to its highest level since September 2008. Kuroda’s BoJ has gone boldly where no BoJ governor has gone before (the infamous Koreikyo Takahashi as finance minister in the 1930s was able to browbeat the BoJ at the time to underwrite his reflation scheme), after decades of half-hearted BoJ tinkering to fend off political pressure. This is the ultimate test of monetary activism that will go down in history, regardless if ultimately a success or a disaster. The BoJ wants to “drastically change the expectations of markets and economic entities”, and jerk Japan’s economy out of a deflation rut its been for nearly 15 years.
To achieve its 2% inflation in 2 years target, the BoJ will
  • Shift to monetary base control from uncollateralized overnight rates in growing the monetary baseJPY60~JPY70billion per year. 
  • Increase JGB purchases along the curve to 40-year notes by JPY50 trillion per year, to JPY270 trillion by 2014. 
  • Increase ETF and J-REIT purchases, but abandon the prior asset purchasing program
  • Suspend the bank note principle, where new money created is limited to outstanding notes and coins in circulation.
The BoJ is now committed to doubling Japan’s monetary base, its holdings of JGBs all along the curve to 40yr notes, and ETFs, in two years. The average remaining maturity of JGB purchases will more than double to about seven years. The comparative scale of this move is monetizing at a rate of around 75% of the Fed in an economy that is one-third the size of the U.S., in essentially printing 15% of its GDP each year in new money. The monetary base will rocket from 29% to 56% of GDP by 2014. The pace of bond purchases will rise to JPY7.5 trillion yen a month.

Source: Bank of Japan
Uber-Bears More Strongly Convinced this Will End Badly
Japan uber-bear Kyle Bass of course is warning this “Giant Experiment,” will cause Japan to implode under the weight of their own debt much faster than previously. But even he is exorting, “if you’re Japanese, spend! …. (if don’t take your money out of the country), “borrow in JPY and invest in productive assets,” which of course is the whole object of the great Abenomics experiment exercise. George Soros chimed in with, “What Japan is doing right now is actually quite dangerous because they are doing it after 25 years of just simply accumulating deficits and not getting the economy growing,” …”So if what they’re doing gets something started, they might not be able to stop it. If the yen starts to fall, which it has done, then people in Japan think it’s liable to continue, and may become like an avalanche”. 
The IMF in its own bureaucrat speak has also warned of this risk, (despite being readily able to fund its debt to date) “the market’s capacity to absorb new debt is likely to diminish as the population ages and risk appetite recovers. Without a significant policy adjustment, the stock of gross public debt could exceed household financial assets in around 10 years, at which point domestic financing may become more difficult. Over the near term, domestic and external risks include, a) a decline in the supply of funds for financing JGBs as private spending picks up, b) an increase in market volatility could also push banks to shorten the maturity of their JGB holdings or reduce their JGB exposures to limit losses. As for external risks, the high correlation between yields on JGBs and other sovereign debts pose the risk that a sudden rise in global risk premia could spillover and affect the JGB market. In sum, a sustained rise in yields could dramatically worsen public debt dynamics, and threaten financial stability.
Source: BarChart
Source of Domestic JGB Demand: Huge Financial Surpluses in the Corporate Sector
The flip side of ballooning government debt has been an equally large financial surplus in the private sector as companies retrench and hoard cash. To us, the first sign of serious trouble in Japan’s JGB market could be companies drawing down excess funds to fund increased business activity and capital expenditures, thus forcing the financial institutions at where these excess funds are parked to liquidate JGBs. 
Historically, this has had only modest impact on pushing up yields, but Japan is now much more leveraged with government debt. 
Short JPY, Long Japan Stocks Still Works
The biggest money maker for hedge funds and speculators since November of last year has been the short yen/long Japan stocks trade, which has produced a combined 60%-plus gain (+40% for the Nikkei 225, -20% for FXY) but the hedge funds will tell you there is much more to go with this trade, as the BoJ is just getting started. One reason is that the domestic institutions have been selling Japanese equities, while Japanese corporates have been buying JPY.
Source: Yahoo.com
 MMT’ers: Countries That Hold Debt in their Own Currency Can’t Go Bankrupt
MMT’ers (Modern Monetary Theorists) like Cullen Roche, even though they may not like the Japan trade, still insist the whole insolvency scare thing is senseless, because even Austrian economists can tell you that a nation with a printing press and debt denominated in its own currency isn’t going to go bankrupt. 
Black Swans (Tail Risks)

As we have said many times, Abenomics and BoJ shock and awe entail potentially big risks for Japan, while we believe they have no choice but to try anything to revive Japan’s economy and turn the good ship Japan away from its slowly evolving debt spiral. The tail risks include,
1) Kyle Bass is right and the reflation effort merely accelerates the day of financial crisis reckoning
 Japan experiences a fiscal crisis and JPY collapses, possibly triggering a new global financial 
 crisis.
2) The BoJ huffs and puffs, but nothing happensWhile Paul Samuelson infamously said, “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon,” others insist that just printing money has never created inflation, unless there is excess money. The evidence is that the BoJ has already expanded its balance sheet to roughly 33% of GDP, but has had no appreciable impact on inflation. The Swiss National Bank has a balance sheet worth some 85% of GDP, but no positive inflation since 2011. After nearly a quarter century of poor economic performance and a deeply embedded deflation mentality, the real question should be how the banks, who actually credit credit/money supply, react. If they merely let the money sit in BoJ reserve balances (hoard it), there is no economic impact and the BoJ is still in a liquidity trap. This is what happened between March 2001 and March 2006, when the BoJ first implemented and invented “QE” (quantitative easing). Try as they might, academics have found no significant impact except for a slight downward bias in long JGB yields. Then, the Japanese banks were ostensibly hoarding cash to shore up decimated balance sheets. Now, Japanese bank balance sheets are relatively healthy. Surveys show consumers do have positive inflation expectations, but for the wrong reasons, i.e., the things they have to buy are rising in price (electricity rates, etc.), while the discretionary items they are deferring purchases on are falling in price. Seeing no solid evidence of reflation, foreign investors now piling into Japanese equities head for the exits

3) Japanese banks merely take the BoJ money and lend it overseasIf, as was pointed out via FT Alphaville Japanese banks take this money and lend it overseas, the effect would work to weaken JPY but the monetary stimulus would be felt overseas, not in Japan. Since the BoJ would still be buying truckloads of JGBs, however, the downward pressure on long rates would remain, but since rates are already at rock-bottom levels, an incremental change in and of itself would not move the domestic fund demand needle. Seeing no solid evidence of reflation, foreign investors now piling into Japanese equities head for the exits

4) Increased JGB volatility triggers a VaR shockSome like Zero Hedge have made a big deal of the post announcement market snap-back in JGB yields, but JGB yields had already collapsed from 1.77% in 2009 to a new historical low. Given the very active trading around such a big event that compelled the CME to raise margin requirements to avoid over-leveraged speculation, this could merely be clearing, re-positioning of speculative positions. Since the global financial crisis, JGB futures have gained some 11%, which combined with a massive gain in JPY versus USD of some 47%, has produced a very decent 58% return. The great capital gains in JGBs to date, plus high expectations for aggressive BoJ action, were a big reason why risk-adverse domestic institutions were actually selling Japanese equities and piling into bonds ahead of their March 2013 fiscal year end. As the IMF has warned, however, too much JGB volatility could trigger domestic JGB selloffs like the “VaR shock” in 2003, where market volatility triggered risk hedging among Japan’s banks that tripled JGB yields from 0.45% to 1.6% in just three months. Japanese banks however have already been stress-testing their substantial bond portfolios. This would produce only a short-term, sharp back-up in JGB yields. 

Focus Remains on Domestic Reflation Plays

While the weak JPY is a windfall for Japanese exporters, global demand remains spotty at best, a good deal of exports are actually JPY denominated, and Japanese exporters have been able to significantly hedge their JPY/USD exposure.

Over the past three months, the Topix has gained nearly 17%, lead by nearly 40% surges in rubber products, real estate, warehousing/logistics and land transportation, which excluding rubber products are about as domestic demand dependent as it gets. The high beta broker/dealers and the banks are also up well over 20%, but the gains have recently mitigated vis-a-vis the late-comers.

Source: Tokyo Stock Exhchange
In terms of Nikkei 225 constituents, the stock of electric power zombie TEPCO has surged to lead the pack, followed by 2nd tier car company Mazda, two 2nd tier real estate companies, Sony?, more real estate companies, and now some big department store chains. For old Japan hands, its beginning to look like the good old “bubble” days, when latent asset plays were the force du jour. The department store stocks have perked up on evidence that surging stock prices are stimulating sales of luxury goods. 

Before this rally is over, essentially every constituent in the Nikkei 225 will get its turn to dance as index buying lifts essentially all boats. 
Source: Tokyo Stock Exchange
As of the final week of March (the end of the fiscal year), domestic financial institutions continued to heavily dump Japanese stocks, but the Nikkei 225 has soared despite this on massive foreign net buying. Thus Japanese equity prices remain and should continue to be driven by foreign buying or lack thereof.  From this perspective, who cares what domestic institutions think?

US-based investors caught up in the sudden storm of activity in Japanese equities can of course just go out and buy the MSCI Japan ETF (EWJ) or buy the few ADRs tradeable in the U.S. This group had previously been lagging the Topix by a significant margin, but generally over time track the Topix fairly closely. 

Source: Nikkei Astra, Japan Investor
The following table shows which Japan ADRs are available and what their vital stats look like. The vital stats of course do not reflect the growth, margin, etc. improvements now being discounted into virtually all Japanese stocks. 
Source: Nikkei Astra, Japan Investor
Why All the Market Gurus Got The US Rally Wrong 
The most striking feature of the US stock market’s steady march to new historical highs is that it has dramatically proven most of the so-called smart guys wrong, many of which were right about the 2008 financial crisis and the dangers of toxic US housing market derivatives. Since the recovery began with the bottoming in stock prices in March 2009, the “smart” call has been to doubt the recovery in stock prices and to insist that surging stock prices were merely a central bank-instigated scam. 
Yes, the world is awash in government debt, Euroland is facing a lost generation of unemployed youth in southern Europe and austerity is not fun. 

Austerity is not Fun

Business Insider called out some very well known and often quoted market gurus for their bearish (and very wrong) market calls in 2009-2011, which included the widely read John Mauldin (March 2009), Noriel Roubinini, Bob Janiuah (Nomura), Doug Kass (Seabreeze), Robert Precter (October 2009), Joseph Stiglitz (October 2009), Jeremy Grantham (October 2009), Gary Shilling (October 2009), Bill Gross (October 2009), Mohamed El Erian (December 2009), Albert Edwards (December 2009), Richard Russell (January 2010), George Soros (June 2010), Bill Fleckenstein (July 2010), David Rosenberg (September 2010), John Hussman (October 2010), Walter Zimmerman (December 2011). Jonathan Golub (UBS, December 2011), David Kostin (Goldman Sachs, December 2011), and Marc Faber (August 2012), Most of these gurus made their reputations making gutsy bear calls. Having made their reputations on bear calls, it has been hard for them to change their stripes. Consequently, it probably won’t be this bunch that gets it right this time. When these guys flip and become bullish is when to get worried that the market has topped. 
On the other hand, Warren Buffet’s shareholder letter in 2012 had a spot-on call, e.g., forget about gold and buy US cropland and industrial stocks. Specifically, he said, for $9.6 trillion, you could buy all the gold in the world, and it would fit into a nice cube inside of a baseball field diamond. Or for that money, you could buy all US cropland (400 million acres) + 16 Exxon Mobils, and still have another $1 trillion in pocket money left over. 
The first tenant that all the smart guys forgot was the old market adage “don’t fight the Fed”. The Fed, the ECB, the BoE and to a lesser extent, the BoJ have remained committed to providing whatever support investors thought was needed to support financial markets in the name of supporting teetering financial systems and weak economies. In other words, a) the Euro union has not (yet) collapsed or broken up, (b) China has not seen a hard landing, (c) Japan’s debt mountain has yet to trigger a fiscal crisis, (d) the U.S. economy has not lapsed back into recession. Yet many continue to believe that three major blocs of the developed world are careening toward a debt-fueled crisis that cannot end well. 
The Rodney Dangerfield of Bull Markets: Absolutely No Respect 
Bond yields in the core of Europe, Japan and the US have not only been stable, but have delved new lows, and the DJIA has renewed a new historical high. Perhaps it’s time to stop listening to these polyannas and re-assess what financial markets are trying to tell us, and to listen more to those few who are now suggesting a market melt-up, like Ed Yardeni of Yardeni Research, who describer the rally as “the Rodney Dangerfield of bull markets,” “It’s got absolutely no respect, and yet, here were are taking out the all-time highs.” Actually, US stock prices, despite the political circus in Washington over the debt ceiling, may actually just might be trying to discount big changes for the better in the U.S. economy. 
1) The US housing market recovery is gathering steam. Even the stock glut is clearing. Inventories were down 25.3% from January 2012. At the current pace of sales, inventories would be exhausted in 4.2 months, 
2) The windfall from shale oil and natural gas development. The Federal Reserve Beige Book cited shale development is cited seven times as an unimpeachable strong growth sector of the U.S. economy. 
The OECD’s composite leading indicators (CLIs) for January show signs of stabilizing economic outlooks in most major economies. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the CLI continues to point to economic growth firming. In China and India, signs of a turning point are more marked than in last month’s assessment. The CLIs for Italy, Germany, France and the Euro Area as a whole point to a stabilization in growth prospects. Five years after the global financial crisis, investment banks like Societe Generale are beginning to suggest that 2013 will be a breakout year for the US economy, when investors realize the U.S. economy is finally breaking away from the “new normal” and the days of QE are numbered. 
The new market highs are being driven by the “old economy”. While the S&P 500 has yet to renew 2007 highs, the DJIA has, led by the Dow Transports. Further the Russell 2000 index of small cap stocks has surged ahead of the tech-heavy S&P 500, suggesting broadly based movement in the grass-roots economy. Thus it would appear to be only a matter of time before the S&P 500 
Source: Big Charts.com
Source: Big Charts.com
For the man/woman on the street, however, all of this is esoteric, and has absolutely nothing to do with their daily lives. From the following metrics that directly affect people’s lives and livelihoods in the U.S., it is a wonder that consumer sentiment is as good as it is. Income is down, unemployment is up, there are more people on the edge (food stamp recipients, personal bankruptcies, home foreclosures), housing prices are down but so is interest on savings while gasoline prices are up. Thus the 90%+ that have yet to see any benefit from this emerging recovery can be forgiven for remaining generally dour about their lot, and for listening to the smart guys dissing the rally. 
Source: JapanIinvestor
S&P 500 Remains Dominated by Technology, Finance and Health Care

The recent lag in technology as epitomized by Apple’s sagging stock price is a major reason the S&P 500 has not kept pace with the Dow Transports or the Russell 2,000. For the SP 500 rally to continue, the index needs support from its three major sector components, i.e., technology (18% of market cap), financials (16%) and health care (12%), i.e., from two of the sectors most responsible for the “double bubbles” (IT/Internet and Housing). From our side of the pond, a stock like Apple (aapl) still has much room to fail in terms of deflating growth expectations. Just look how poorly Microsoft (msft) has performed in comparison, not because it has become a debt-ridden zombie, but merely because it became a “normal” company with normal growth and mistakes as well as victories. Conversely, a stock like Citigroup (C) has consistently lagged the market because of still-heavy legacy burdens from the 2008 financial crisis, and investors have only recently warmed up to Citi’s recovery prospects, while the stock still carries a significant growth discount (low P/E multiple) and balance sheet uncertainties (PBR under 1.0X). 

Sources: Lipper, Compustat, Goldman Sachs, 
Hat Tip: Big Picure
These Same Smart Guys Continue to Trash Japan
For those that believe a global debt crisis is inevitable, the level of denial in Japan is majestic. They continue to shake their heads in disbelief that Japan can continue to borrow with no consequences with debt 240% of GDP. Why haven’t investors already lost patience/faith in the government and the BoJ? Even investors who are open-minded or even bullish on the recovery potential of Japan have been guilty in the past of jumping the gun and declaring a recovery when there in fact was none. 
Unfortunately, no one has a convincing answer for Japan’s mountain of debt. All that is certain is that Japan hasn’t blown up its finances yet, and is probably unlikely to for the foreseeable future. 
Not only have JGB yields remained subdued in the face of almost certain reflation, more government deficit spending and a much more aggressive BoJ, the prognosis is that 10yr JGB yields could actually test a new historical low of 0.43% over the next several months. 
Domestic Institutions Have a Different Agenda than Foreign Investors
The reason is that domestic institutions with a different agenda than foreign investors are the real driver of JGB yields. The Japan Securities Dealers Association’s (JSDA) statistics (excluding short-term securities) reveals a striking volume of JGB buying by trust banks in long and super-long JGBs in January–in sharp contrast with the sluggish activity of other investors. Domestic institutions are taking advantage of the weakening yen and the rally in global stocks to take profit on foreign assets and shift these funds to domestic bonds. Japanese trust banks bought a net ¥2,439.2bn ($26bn) of JGBs in January, the highest net total since April 2009, while they sold a net ¥1,051.0bn in foreign securities for the highest single-month net selloff since 2005. 
The movement of Japan’s trust banks is counter-intuitive given current the current consensus for a weaker JPY and Japan reflation that ostensibly would push up JGB yields. But Japan’s trust banks and public pension funds follow a mechanistic asset allocation regime that dictates periodical re-balancing of portfolio weights to pre-set allocation targets, regardless of what prevailing market sentiment may indicate. Consequently, while foreign investors are shorting JPY and going long the Nikkei 225, domestic investors are selling foreign assets and shifting funds into JGBs.
Sources: Nikkei Amsus, Japan Investor
The problem is that, at some, point, the movement in stocks has to find some agreement in what is happening in the bond market. Normally, a major drop-off in bond yields is followed by a selloff in stock prices, because falling bond yields is primarily a reflection of darkening sentiment regarding economic growth and corporate profits. This time, the Abenomics reflation story is already brightening investor and business sentiment, yet bond yields continue to fall. 
A 25%~30% Decline in Japan’s Effective Exchange Rate Will Significantly Raise Japan’s Export Competitiveness
As regards the JPY/USD exchange rate, however, what’s more important than the actual level of bond yields is the gap between US and Japan bond yields. Here, we see a noticeable widening of US-Japan bond yields is supporting the weak move in JPY, meaning there is more than just hot air (Abe verbage) supporting the selloff in JPY. 
Nikkei Amsus: Japan Investor
While much of the media and the Street talk of nothing but JPY/USD exchange rates, but the more important exchange rate is the real effective (trade weighted) JPY exchange rate. The surge in this rate from 25-year lows after the 2008 financial crisis is what hurt export profitability the most. Abenomics however has pushed Japan’s effective exchange rate weaker at even a more rapid pace than the JPY/USD nominal exchange rate. 
Some overseas investors see the weaker JPY creating a serious problem for Japan because of its increased dependence on imported energy, but as was seen between 2004 and 2007, the dramatic decline in the effective exchange rate created a much bigger benefit to Japan’s economy from increased export competitiveness than it was negative from the standpoint of increased cost of imported energy. We believe investors will be surprised by how competitive Japanese companies have suddenly become with this 27%~30% decline in Japan’s real effective exchange rates
Source: Bank of Japan

Foreign Institutions Still Very Underweight Japan

As is seen in the chart below, Japan has been outperforming the US and EAFE markets for the past 3 months. Regardless of what John Mauldin or Kyle Bass thinks of Japan’s stock rally, foreign institutions increasingly will be compelled to bring in some cases what had been zero Japan or very underweight Japan weights in their international and global portfolios back at least toward neutral by the outperformance of the Topix or MSCI Japan benchmark indices if this out-performance continues, as they try to match or beat their benchmark bogies. 
As exemplified by the reported $1 billion George Soros made shorting JPY, the fast money jumped in quickly, shorting JPY and going long the Nikkei 225. This time, the smart guys were spot on ,despite taking their lumps in gold and in being too cautious about US stocks. 
Source: MSCI
So far, however, it appears (from the CFTC commitment of traders) they in the main are maintaining most of their short JPY positions despite massive paper profits. Notice in the chart however that there is a lag between the sharp sell-off in JPY/USD and the buildup of these short positions. From the previously mentioned large selling of foreign securities by Japanese institutions, it appears that this repatriation back into JGBs significantly accelerated JPY/USD selloff momentum. If this is true, the pace of JPY/USD weakening could weaken considerably going forward, even if the general trend is toward further weakening. 
Source: Oanda
While the rally in the Nikkei 225 since November 2012 has been extremely sharp (+42% from a November 2012 low), it is basically little more than a blip on the long-term monthly chart, and nowhere near the degree of recovery seen in the US stock market, which is back to an historical high. Just getting the Nikkei 225 back to the June 2007 high represents further upside of over 50%, while getting the Nikkei 225 to recover just under half the market capitalization lost since December 1989 implies an 88% surge. Thus if there is anything of any medium-term merit to Abenomics, Japanese stocks have significant upside potential indeed. 
Source: Yahoo.com
No Domestic Institutional Participation so Far
Just getting back to the June 2007 high will require participation from domestic investors. While foreign investors were buying some JPY3, 834 million net of Japanese equities since week 2 of November 2012, domestic institutions and individual investors were dumping their holdings of Japanese stocks to the tune of some JPY1,651 million. It is not hard to imagine where the Nikkei would be today if there was also participation from domestic investors. 
So far, there has been little discernable movement toward raising targeted domestic equity weights in Japanese institutional investor portfolios. Indeed, it has been the opposite, i.e., lowering target domestic equity weights. However, the GPIF has come out and said that Abenomics has forced them to re-think their domestic equity weightings and in particular the potential risk of their massive JGB holdings. 
The now deeply entrenched deflationary mindset that has set in Japan won’t be eradicated that easily, and it is likely that the recovery rally in Japanese equities will be well on its way before the domestic institutions seriously consider a significant shift back into Japanese equities. Thus for the time being, foreign investors and to a much lesser extent, domestic individuals will have to do the heavy lifting in pushing the Nikkei 225 and other benchmark Japan equity indices higher. 
In looking at the best-performing Topix sectors over the past 6 months, broker/dealers, real estate, and (real estate proxy) warehousing/logistics have dominated, i.e., the classic bubble-era champions. Performance of the large-cap banks, a foreign investor favorite because of cheap valuations (i.e., low P/E multiples, less than 1 PBRs and relatively high dividend yields), has been average to above average. 
Sources: Nikkei, Japan Investor
By Nikkei 225 constituent, the top performing stocks since the rally began have been a combination of second-tier automobile firms (Mazda, Fuji Heavy), broker/dealers (Nomura, Daiwa), second-tier real estate companies (Tokyu, Heiwa), and steel companies (Kawasaki, JFE), with a couple of shipping companies thrown in. On the other hand, with the exception of Sharp, who has been in play with foreign capital, stocks in Japan’s electronics sector who would ostensibly benefit from a weaker JPY have not fared as well (Yokogawa El, Nikon, Kyocera, DN Screen, etc.). 
Consequently, the real plays in this rally have and will likely continue to be reflation plays

Sources: Nikkei, Japan Investor