Archive for the ‘Japanese Finance’ Category

The Japan Life Insurers Association (JLIA) has released their latest survey of listed Japanese company efforts to improve shareholder value. The annual survey for FY2013 surveyed 1,129 companies (with some 575 companies responding) and 158 Japanese institutional investors. In short, the biggest beefs the JLIA has with their investee companies are,

1) Establishment and Disclosure of Mid-Term Management Targets

a) Better disclosure and explanation of established mid-term management plans.

b) Specific ROE target levels and plans to improve this over time.

c) Better explanations for the appropriateness of the company’s capital plans and use of cash on hand.

2) Better Shareholder Returns

a) Better explanations, establishment and disclosure of policies for improving shareholder returns.

b) The adoption of a 30% dividend payout policy as a standard, medium-term payout.

c) More active shareholder buyback programs.

3) Better Corporate Governance

a) Better engagement with shareholders/investors and regular auditing/review of legal compliance.

b) Better explanation of management proposals to shareholders and making proxy voting easier.

 

While the Association does see continued interest in engagement on both the part of institutional investors and corporates, they do see significant perception gaps between the two parties regarding the above issues.

 

 

Japan’s JPY124 trillion public pension fund, the largest in the world, is shifting assets to equities and foreign bonds, away from domestic government bonds (JGBs). At the end of its FY2013 (to March 2014), the pension fund shifted its target allocations as follows;

Domestic bonds to 60% (from 67%), Domestic stocks 12% (11%), International bonds 11% (8%) and International stocks 12% (9%). It is also increasing its mandates to foreign asset management firms, away from traditional domestic pension fund managers such as the life insurance companies.

It is currently seeking foreign managers for its foreign bond portfolio, and has recently added 10 new (mainly foreign asset manager) mandates while cancelling 8. New foreign manager mandates (which average about $3.0 billion per mandate) include,

-Capital International Inc.
-Goldman Sachs Asset Management
-Dimensional Fund Advisors
-Russell Implementation Serivces
-Harris Associates
-Taiyo Pacific Partners
-FIL Investments (Japan)
-J.P. Morgan Asset Management (Japan)
-Invesco Asset Management (Japan)

One feature of the new domestic stock active management mandates is that it includes “activist” asset managers that in the past have engaged with Japanese corporate management, such as Harris Associates and Taiyo Pacific Partners.

At the same time the GPIF has diversified its passive management investment benchmarks from Topix-only, to the new JPX-Nikkei 400, MSIC Japan and the Russell Nomura Prime indices, and is partnering with the Development Bank of Japan and the Ontario Municipal Employee’s System to expand its infrastructure investment portfolio to some 0.2% of total assets, and is looking at expending its alternative investments, i.e., real estate, private equity and hedge funds in a bid to improve failing investment returns.

 

The IMF is telling Japan to stress the “urgency of credible fiscal adjustment”. But so what? Its not like the Kan Administration will actually be able to do anything about it.

The IMF said Japan needs to curb spending growth in non-social security and to reform entitlements. Japan also needs to raise consumption taxes gradually from 2011 while combining these hikes with personal income tax allotments and corporate tax reform. It also needs to introduce a cap on public debt. The BOJ for its part should prepare additional monetary easing steps to fight deflation.

At a November 2009 meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bankers, then-Senior Vice Finance Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced a fiscal reconstruction plan. It was not until June 2010 announced to the Japanese public a formal fiscal reconstruction plan for achieving a surplus in the primary budget by the end of fiscal 2020 and keeping new bond issuance below this fiscal year’s ¥44 trillion, again with little in the way of specific action plans. The fiscal rehabilitation plan was announced just ahead of Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s departure to Canada to attend the summit of the Group of 20 major economies and emerging powers.

As Kan (and his finance minister) are supposed to be a fiscal hawks, the IMF is preaching to the choir. Problem is, the Kan Administration does not have either the voter support or the support within its own party (the DPJ)–let alone the opposition parties–to really do anything about it.

A Yomiuri shimbun voter survey taken after the disastrous upper house elections for the DPJ shows the Kan Cabinet’s vote support has taken a big hit, with its approval rating plunging to 38% and its disapproval rating climbing above 50%–this after approval ratings temporarily shot up above 60% when Kan was named the replacement prime minister for the hapless Yukio Hatoyama and quickly distanced himself from the shadowy Ichiro Ozawa. The drop in voter approval ratings is dramatic. Former prime minister (LDP) Yoshiro Mori had held the record for the most dramatic fall in support–by 14 points–over one month. The 26-point plunge in Kan’s approval sets a new record. Further, this is the first time since the Mori Cabinet in 2000 that approval/disapproval ratings have completely switched in a month.

Everyone, including the voting public, is very well aware of the medium-to-long-term dangers of Japan’s government debt mountain. The problem is, there is a political right way and a wrong way to breach the subject with Japan’s voting public. Historically, LDP and now DPJ politicians have been particularly adept at doing it exactly the wrong way. Blurting out the need for a doubling of the consumption tax just before an election has and will continue to be political suicide.

The UK’s Telegraph (Ambrose Evans-Pritchard)is warning that global investors and governments should be worrying about Japan’s debt more than the US debt.

The scenario is that Japan is drifting helplessly toward a fiscal crisis. Simon Johnson, former IMF chief economist, reportedly told the US Congress that Japan’s debt path is essentially out of control, and that there is a real risk of Japan ending up in a major default. According to new IMF forecasts, Japan’s public debt is seen ballooning to 218% in 2009 from a prior 197% or so, rising further to 227% in 2010 and to a whopping 246% by 2014. This level of indebtedness is unprecedented in peace time economies.

Heretofore, the bulk of Japan’s public debt has been absorbed by the private sector through excess savings. But Japan’s savings rate has plunged from 15% in 1990 to 2%. Japan’s (and the world’s) largest pension fund, the GPIF, has become a net seller of JGBs to fund pay-out obligations, and the Japan Post Bank is baulking at adding more JGBs to their $1.7 trillion outstanding balance. If bond rates in Japan were to rise to 3%~4%, it could shatter the government’s finances. JGB yields were at 2% as recently as 2007.

Carl Weinberg of High Frequency Economics, always one to not shy away from hyperbole, is quoted as saying that the Japanese debt situation is irrecoverable, with the potential outcome being fiscal shutdown, lost pensions and bank failures. Japan is also again on the verge of a deflation spiral that will exacerbate the debt burden.
Financial markets are beginning to discount this risk, with CDS on 5-year debt jumping from 35bps to 63bps, or above and away global peers like Germany, France, the US and the UK.

Ben Bernanke on the US Response to the Financial Crisis

At the Council of Foreign Relations, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke made comments (Financial Reforms to Address Risk) that shed light on how the US regulatory environment might in the future change, including an expanded regulatory role by the Federal Reserve, and/or the introduction of “an authority specifically charged with monitoring and addressing systemic risks”.

He starts with the admission that, “…broadly speaking, the risk-management systems of the private sector and government oversight of the financial sector in the United States and some other industrial countries failed to ensure that an inrush of capital was prudently invested.” “In certain respects, (the US) experience parallels that of some emerging-market countries in the 1990s, whose financial sectors and regulatory regimes likewise proved inadequate for efficiently investing large inflows of saving from abroad. When those failures became evident, investors lost confidence and crises ensued. A clear and highly consequential difference, however, is that the crises of the 1990s were regional, whereas the current crisis has become global.”

And then goes on to say that, “We (the US) must have a strategy that regulates the financial system as a whole, in a holistic way, not just its individual components,” and that “…we should consider whether the creation of an authority specifically charged with monitoring and addressing systemic risks would help protect the system from financial crises like the one we are currently experiencing.”

Mr. Bernanke admits that “the Federal Reserve relies on a patchwork of authorities, largely derived from the Fed’s role as a banking supervisor, as well as on moral suasion to help ensure that critical payment and settlement systems have the necessary procedures and controls in place to manage their risks. By contrast, many major central banks around the world have an explicit statutory basis for their oversight of these systems. Given how important robust payment and settlement systems are to financial stability, a good case can be made for granting the Federal Reserve explicit oversight authority for systemically important payment and settlement systems.”

Moreover, “Financial stability could be further enhanced by a more explicitly macroprudential approach to financial regulation and supervision in the United States. Macroprudential policies focus on risks to the financial system as a whole. Such risks may be crosscutting, affecting a number of firms and markets, or they may be concentrated in a few key areas. A macroprudential approach would complement and build on the current regulatory and supervisory structure, in which the primary focus is the safety and soundness of individual institutions and markets.”

Mr. Bernanke goes on to say that one way that macroprudential policies could be better integrated into the regulatory and supervisory system would be“for the Congress to direct and empower a (new) governmental authority to monitor, assess, and, if necessary, address potential systemic risks within the financial system.

The elements of such an authority’s mission would ostensibly include, for example,

(1) monitoring large or rapidly increasing exposures–such as to subprime mortgages–across firms and markets, rather than only at the level of individual firms or sectors;

(2) assessing the potential for deficiencies in evolving risk-management practices, broad-based increases in financial leverage, or changes in financial markets or products to increase systemic risks;

(3) analyzing possible spillovers between financial firms or between firms and markets, such as the mutual exposures of highly interconnected firms; and

(4) identifying possible regulatory gaps, including gaps in the protection of consumers and investors, that pose risks for the system as a whole.”

Two areas of natural focus for a systemic risk authority would be the stability of systemically critical financial institutions and the systemically relevant aspects of the financial infrastructure.”

The United Kingdom and Japan’s response to the issues highlighted by the Fed Chairman was the establishment of a financial services authority whose supervision and control mandate went beyond the formal banking system to include the so-called shadow banking system” outside the formal control of the central bank.

The United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority

The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is an independent non-governmental body given statutory powers by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It is a company limited by guarantee and financed by the financial services industry. The Treasury appoints the FSA Board, which currently consists of a Chairman, a Chief Executive Officer, three Managing Directors, and 9 non-executive directors (including a lead non-executive member, the Deputy Chairman). This Board sets overall policy, but day-to-day decisions and management of the staff are the responsibility of the Executive.The FSA is accountable to Treasury Ministers, and through them to Parliament. It is operationally independent of Government and is funded entirely by the firms it regulates.

Its ARROW principal, which stands for the Advanced, Risk-Responsive Operating framework, is the heart of its risk-based approach to regulation. The FSA supervises firms according to the risks they present to statutory objectives. It assess risks in terms of their impact (the scale of the effect these risks will have on consumers and the market if they were to happen) and probability (the likelihood of the particular issue occurring). In relation to medium and high-impact firms. Their work is coordinated through a relationship manager, who carries out a regular risk assessment (on a cycle of one to four years) and determines a risk mitigation program proportionate to the risks identified. The precise volume and type of work undertaken depends on the size and riskiness of the firm concerned.  For high impact firms, it applies a closer monitoring regime. This is essentially a planned schedule of ARROW visits to the firm throughout the regulatory period. This allows the supervisory team to meet the firm’s senior management and control functions regularly.

The FSA is the designated competent authority under the European single market directives for banking, insurance, investment business, and other financial services including insurance intermediation. The FSA is also the competent authority under a host of other EU directives, including the Market Abuse and Prospectus Directives. European legislation affecting the FSA is implemented domestically through FSMA and / or HMT regulations. Other main areas of FSA regulation include pension schemes and activities relating to mortgage contracts. The FSA has authorization, enforcement, supervision and rule making functions. It also has registration functions under the various pieces of legislation applicable to mutual societies and related functions under other legislation applicable to financial services and listing.

Japan’s Financial Services Agency

In 1998, Japan established a Financial Supervisory Agency as an administrative organ under the Financial Reconstruction Commission at the height of Japan’s financial crisis. The organization was later reorganized to become the Financial Services Agency (FSA) in taking over planning of the financial system for which the Ministry of Finance had been responsible. Through further organization, the FSA essentially assumed the portfolio of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance and became an external organ of the Cabinet Office, and with concurrent abolishment of the FRC, the FSA took over the business concerning disposition of failed financial institutions. It is now the parent organization for The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission and the Certified Public Accountants and Auditing Oversight Board. The FSA is responsible for supervising and inspecting all retail and wholesale banks, securities companies, insurance companies, investment management companies, and other non-bank financial institutions. It also supervises certified public accountants and auditing firms and surveillance of compliance rules in securities markets.

The FSA’s Inspection Bureau conducts inspections of financial institutions with the mission of examining the institutions’ compliance with regulations and risk management, to point out identified problems, and uses on-site inspections to ensure the soundness and appropriateness of financial institution operations. The Supervisory Bureau takes administrative actions based on the findings of the Inspection Bureau.

From April 2007, the FSA started full-fledged implementation of its Financial Inspection Rating System, which provides inspection results in the form of graded evaluations (i.e. ratings) that offer significant incentives for voluntary and sustained improvement in management on the part of the financial institutions. To put teeth in its inspection activities, the Inspection Bureau has proactively hired specialists from the private sector with first-hand knowledge of financial institution operations. The FSA operates through eleven regional offices.

FT Alphaville is reporting that the Baltic Dry index (BDI), widely considered a benchmark index for global trade in dry bulk commodities such as iron ore, coal and iron, jumped almost 15% to 1,316 points on Wednesday. the biggest daily increase in almost 25 years, on signs of a recovery in the raw materials trade.

The signs of life are in Capsizes, the largest vessels, as Chinese steel makers buy more iron ore from Australia and Brazil. The index of course is still nowhere near last year’s all-time high 11,793 points, but has already rebounded 98.5% from its December 22-year low of 663 points.

Japan’s Kawasaki KK (9107.T) upticked on the news, while The Australian is reporting that iron ore majors are confident they have spotted a bottom in prices. “Fortescue executive director Graeme Rowley reflected incipient confidence within Fortescue’s major iron ore cousins, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton, that the spot market is again on the move”. “The bottom of this slowdown has been reached and we are starting to see a comeback in prices,” says Mr. Rowley. This versus the wide-spread conjecture that iron ore prices could fall by as much as 40 per cent this year.

The reality check is that Fortescue (Fortescue FPO, ASX: FMG.AX)is still cash-flow negative, having burned another $484 million over the half as it continued to invest against its ambition to mine and deliver 45 million tonnes of ore by as early as the end of calendar 2009. Companhia Vale ADS ((NYQ: RIO) bounced just over 5% yesterday in NY.

FT Alphaville
The Australian

Investors in Japanese equities are in shock and awe at the depth and rapidity at which key indicators of Japan’s economy and major industries are deteriorating. The Japan Economic Journal’s (Nikkei) index of business conditions for December deteriorated 5.5 points to 90.5, representing the sharpest deterioration since the index began in 1973, following another record decline in November.

Automobiles and Electronics Hit Hardest

The December production plunge in key sectors such as automobiles and electronic devices was over 10%, while commercial sales also fell 7.0% as wholesale and retail sales also fell. While the problems of Japan’s automobile makers are probably the most reported overseas, sales and earnings at Japan’s 8 major electronic firms are also rapidly deteriorating.

Hitachi (6501.T), Panasonic (6752.T), Sony (6758.T), Toshiba (6502.T), Fujitsu (6702.T), NEC (6701.T), Mitsubishi Electric (6503.T) and Sharp (6753.T) now expect to lose a combined JPY1.93 trillion of net income ($21.4 billion) in the fiscal year ending March 31, 2009, which is equal to the losses incurred in March, 2002 following the bursting of the IT bubble–after which these companies had already gone through a period of deep restructuring and, as the popular buzz word says, “selecting and concentrating” their businesses.

The rapidly accumulating losses at these firms is forcing domestic and overseas plant closures, and the loss of some 53,780 jobs to date as sales are expected to plunge anywhere from 10%~15% for the fiscal year, with the drop-off in demand in Q3, Q4 of the fiscal year being simply unlike these companies have ever seen–not in the tech bubble burst, or during the oil shocks of the 1970s.

FY08 Losses announced so far:

Hitachi: net loss JPY700 billion, 11% YoY sales decline
Panasonic: net loss JPY380 billion, 15% sales decline
NEC: net loss JPY290 billion, 9% sales decline
Toshiba: net loss JPY280 billion, 13% sales decline
Sony: net loss JPY150 billion, 13% sales decline
Sharp: net loss JPY100 billion, unk sales decline
Fujitsu: net loss JPY20 billion, 12% sales decline
Mitsubishi Electric: net loss JPY10 billion, 11% sales decline

As these companies see no signs of improvement for the foreseeable future, they have embarked on deep restructuring plans. We think the current recession/depression will lead to further industry consolidation. Panasonic is already in the process of merging its Osaka cousin, Sanyo Electric,

During the financial crisis of the Heisei Malaise, Japan’s banking sector underwent massive consolidation and restructuring which pruned the numbers of “major” banks essentially into four megabank groups. Essentially, Japan has too many manufacturers of essentially every major electronic product group. We would not be surprised to see Japan’s electronic majors also consolidate into a much smaller number of companies that exist today, as the industry is starting to look like Japan’s steel industry in the early 1990s.

The history of Japan’s steel industry since the end of Japan’s rapid economic growth in the early 1970s has been one of constant downsizing. Since the early 1990s, Northeast Asia’s steel industry has undergone a remarkable restructuring process. Notably, the region’s steel industry lost over 1 million jobs, and mergers as well as strategic alliances among the region’s largest steel makers have proliferated.

Despite substantial restructuring, there are still too many Japanese electronics companies competing in overcrowded markets. There is also a danger that the digital consumer electronics sector will go down the same path as the PC industry, where standardization of technologies and modularization of components led to a plunge in prices, the emergence of very strong competitors in Asia, and the concentration of profits in a few hands. Going forward, they will be faced with joining forces to reduce the amount of domestic competition, and to create national champions to compete against ever stronger overseas competitors.

Plunging global demand, a strong yen, a dearth of domestic demand and substantial write-offs are decimating the earnings of Japan’s biggest companies in FY08 to March 31, 2009.

Toyota (7201.T), Japan’s largest listed company in market capitalization, is expecting its first operating loss ever. Mitsubishi UFJ FG (8306), number four in market cap, is expecting net losses because of substantial write-downs, Tokyo Electric Power (9501.T), number 8 in market cap, is struggling to slash costs to avoid a third consecutive year of net losses. Takeda (4502.T)–number 10 in market cap, saw its free cash flow plunge JPY921.8 billion yen on the year to a net outflow of 653.5 billion yen in the first half of fiscal 2008 on acquisitions, Sumitomo Mitsui FG (8316.T), number 11 in market cap will be reporting net losses, as will Panasonic (6752.T) and Mizuho FG (8411).

The only companies in the top 15 of market capitalization not expecting operating or net losses are; NTT Docomo (9437.T, #2), NTT (9432.T, #3), Honda (7267.T, #5), Nintendo (7974.T, #6), JT (2914.T, #14), while earnings downgrades have triggered selling in these names as well.

In effect, the “E” in market P/E multiples is evaporating, resulting in a forward multiple for the Japanese market of 25.8X on the Nikkei 225 versus a trailing multiple of only 8.9X. As a result, the forward earnings yield has plunged to 4.01% versus a trailing 9.84%, resulting in an ROE of 3.4% on forward earnings versus 10.0% on trailing earnings. Consequently, investors remain gun shy even as price-to-book multiples are only 0.89X reported book for the Nikkei 225 because net losses in FY08 will reduce reported book value by an as-yet undetermined degree.

DRAM spot prices recently surged 27% on the news that the #2 global producer, Qimonda AG of Germany, had filed for bankruptcy after the EU refused to offer a bailout package. DRAM producer stock prices twitched upward in response, but the industry is far, far from recovery.

The sector has been mired in its worst-ever downturn for more than a year, with all major players now reporting losses on their operations due to a large oversupply of the chips used mainly in PCs. According to preliminary estimates from iSuppli, global DRAM revenue fell by 19.8% in 2008, the second year of decline.

Samsung Electronics (SSNHY.PK) the crown jewel of South Korea’s No. 1 chaebol, is expected to run its first quarterly loss in at least eight years. Taiwan’s top three DRAM makers, Powerchip (5346.TW), Nanya Technology and ProMOS (5387.TWO) are all currently working with the Taiwan government on plans to rescue the local industry.Micron Technology (MU) of the US is also in serious financial difficulty after reporting a quarterly loss of $706 million in December.

In Japan, the world’s #3 DRAM maker Elpida (6665.T) is considering applying for government bailout money based on the passage of the Act on Special Measures for Industrial Revitalization, which was recently approved by the Japanese cabinet. They would receive bailout money in lieu of preferred stocks issued to the Development Bank of Japan. The company is looking at a net loss of at least JPY100 billion, while net assets are still around JPY302 billion, ostensibly meaning there is no danger of imminent failure. Elpida and their Taiwan partner ProMos had their bailout proposal turned down by the Taiwanese government.

The FT Alphaville site has a ditty about Japan’s recession and notes that the FT’s Lex had a ditty the previous week about Japan’s recession dubbed “assuming Godzilla-like proportions“.

Japan-watcher Frank Veneroso says that “THERE HAS NEVER BEEN DATA THIS BAD FOR ANY MAJOR ECONOMY — EVEN IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION”. Ergo, the world is “bitching and moaning” (FT term) about Japan’s refusal to act to stimulate its economy, and its seeming inability to take meaningful action on combating the global financial crisis.

We agree with the more famous of Japan-watchers, Peter Tasker, who says that Japan’s policy-makers have “never been serious about delivering a sustainable consumer recovery”. They have never needed to be as long as the export sector remained in good health – as it did through most of the post-bubble era, thanks to good growth in major export markets and a progressively undervalued real yen, he notes. (FT quote).

So, when current Prime Minister Taro Aso promises overseas that Japan will be the first to recover from the growing depression, not a soul believes him. Moreover, pushing the yen past JPY85/USD and to new highs in the JPY index is like beating a dead horse.